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ABSTRACT
This study is concerned with the integral development
of the Papaloapan River Basin in South Mexico, in the context
of Mexico's regional development policy (1947-1970). The main
objectives of this inquiry are to identify the possible reasons
for the relative underdevelopment of that part of the country
as compared to national average levels and to explore the
possibility that for a developing country such as Mexico a
conflict between national economic growth and regional
development need not exist.
These objectives are pursued within a "core-
periphery" conceptual framework of analysis in order to account
for existing regional development imbalances and spatial
disequilibrium in Mexico; and through a multiple regression
exercise by which the impact of infrastructure investment in
Mexico's regional development is investigated. The main body
of this research evaluates the infrastructure development
activities of the Papaloapan Commission in the river basin area
(1947-1970) in regard to the extent to which those activities
fulfilled national development objectives versus regional
needs.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Karen R. Polenske
Title: Professor of Regional Political
Economy and Planning
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PREFACE
This research on the Papaloapan Project arose because
of my interest in reformulating some basic questions about the
development problems of Latin American Indian populations,
particularly the use of their natural resources and their
integration into the national economic and social mainstreams.
Mexico's National Indian Institute was created in
1946 to promote the development of the indigenous groups of the
country. However, at the present time the most marginalized
areas of the country in economic and social terms (including a
large portion of the Papaloapan basin) are still predominantly
Indian populated.
The "Indian problem" in Mexico has been approached by
the government as a cultural one. National integration has
been pursued as cultural homogenization rather than as the
systematic decrease of marginality in its various aspects.
This inquiry addresses some of the issues of
national, social, and economic integration from a regional
development planning perspective. This study views development
planning as a component of a complex process of social
transformation that has to be better understood and properly
handled in order to insure that appropriate actions and
decisions are taken.
A preliminary version of the present inquiry was
prepared under the tutelage of Professor Robert Fogelson and
Professor Bernard Frieden. I am most grateful to them for
their encouragement and helpful criticism. The members of my
thesis committee, Professor Karen R. Polenske, Professor Lloyd
Rodwin, and Dr. Alan M. Strout showed special interest in this
study and provided valuable comments and orientation.
Professor Martin Diskin of the Anthropology Section
at M.I.T. as well as Professor Remy Prud'honme, Visiting
Professor at DUSP (1982-83) contributed in a number of ways to
the understanding of the issues involved. Both Dr. Theodore
MacDonald at Cultural Survival and Mr. Jose Dumoulin at the
World Bank courteously shared valuable references on the
Papaloapan Project. Ms. Marie Southwick word-processed this
version of the manuscript.
This study was made possible in part by a research
grant from the National Wildlife Federation (1982-83) while the
author was a graduate student at M.I.T. supported by the
Mexican Council of Science.
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The planning of Investment
is the corollary of
the planning of Equality.
W.A. Lewis
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Papaloapan Project in Perspective
The Papaloapan Project was the first of several similar
cases of river basin development to be initiated in Mexico.
The Papaloapan Commission, according to its enabling decree of
February 1947, was granted "full power to dictate the
disposition of industrial, agricultural, and colonization
matters as they pertain to the integral development of the
Papaloapan basin" (1). The Commission had some operating
functions similar to those of the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) of the United States. The projects carried out by the
river commission were efforts of what developmental strategists
call "the drive to the interior," which look for an expansion
of economic frontiers. The Papaloapan basin, with an area
about the size of Costa Rica, embraces lands from the states of
Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Puebla (Figure. 1).
The Papaloapan Project had a significant impact on the
region, involving a resettlement of communities, changes in
land use and occupational patterns, and the introduction to the
area of new governmental institutions, among them the National
Indigenista Institute (INI) and the National Colonization
Commission.
The main work undertaken by the Papaloapan Commission was
the construction of the Miguel Aleman dam (completed in 1955)
for the purpose of electric power generation, flood control,
and water supply for the Miguel Aleman irrigation zone.
-9-
Papaloapan Basin Area:
Oaxaca Portion:
Puebla Portion:
Veracruz Portion:
46,517 km2
23,591 km2
5,625 km2
17,301 km2
Oaxaca
Figure 1
Papaloapan River Basin Area
Source: Nafinsa-SRH, 1973
Veracruz
o
Communication facilities were also built, as well as schools
and a few rural health centers. The headquarters of the
Commission was established in a wholly new town called Ciudad
Miguel Aleman.
The project, since its very beginning, has been a
controversial one, mainly because some people believed there
was a better way to spend the allocated resources; and indeed
it seems quite likely: a study carried out under the auspices
of the National Irrigation Commission suggested in 1946 that
flood control by means of five dams on the tributaries of the
Papaloapan, and a bypass canal, was feasible, though expensive,
for the required purposes of flood control and irrigation
(Noriega, 1948).
A post-project evaluation presents quite diverse results
and even opposite conclusions. Howard F. Cline in his book
Mexico: Revolution to Evolution 1940-1960 considers the
Papaloapan Project a successful experiment, while Alfred
Siemens, in a paper regarding agricultural settlement in the
South of Mexico, writes that the results of the Commission's
undertakings are "lessons in mistakes to be avoided" (Siemens,
1966, p. 24).
Thomas T. Poleman (1964), who wrote one of the most
comprehensive studies on the Papaloapan Commission, considers
the project a typical case of proyectismo, that is, a project
of unduly optimistic initial pronouncements succeeded by a rash
of expensive errors, declining official interest, and eventual
abandonment.
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No study on the Papaloapan has assessed the project
results taking into account the distribution of benefits and
costs among the different social groups and zones within the
river basin. It is only through scattered comments that the
distributional aspects of the project are dealt with. For
instance, William Winne, Jr. in his study of the lower zone
(1956) (2), states: "Most of the works were carried out in the
Lower Papaloapan area, not in the mountains nor the plateau."
The public expenditures made through the Papaloapan
Commission were supposed to create a proper environment for the
development of the region as a whole, contributing to its
integration to the nation. However, Oaxaca is still considered
to be one of the most depressed areas of Mexico. At the
present time, it has much lower than national average standards
in educational and health services and in industrial,
transportation and electrification facilities. Not only for
Oaxaca, but for most of the Papaloapan basin, the lack of
infrastructure is considered a major obstacle to development.
2. Mexico: Economic Growth or Regional Development
The case of Oaxaca is not an isolated one, since Mexico's
national economic growth is associated with regional
development disparities, and with relative disequilibrium in
urbanization and industrial concentration. Starting from the
nationalization of its petroleum resources in 1938 and up to
1980, Mexico has seen an inflation-discounted economic growth
rate of never less than 5 percent per year (Gonzalez Casanova,
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1980). However, Mexico's levels of regional income differ
greatly, and it is affirmed that the gap between the richer and
the poorer regions has been increasing (3). Looney and
Frederiksen (1981:295) affirm that median monthly earnings in
Baja California (803 pesos), which was the nation's highest in
1960, were four times as great as median monthly earnings in
Queretaro (197 pesos) which was the nation's lowest. According
to these authors, by 1970 the range from the state with the
highest earnings (Baja California) to that of the lowest
(Oaxaca) had increased to a factor of almost seven (1333
compared with 188 pesos).
These inequalities in regional development can be better
appreciated with the help of the results of a composite index
developed by Unikel and Victoria (1970). The index illustrates
differences in trends in agriculture, industry, labor
productivity, the size and structure of the labor force, and
various social welfare indicators, including the consumption of
gasoline, electric power, and sugar. It also incorporates
differences in housing conditions, health and education (4).
The results of the index over time are presented in figure 2.
Figure 2 shows that state development reflected trends in
the national economy and that progress was far from even. Baja
California Sur, Mexico, Tabasco, Sinaloa, and Morelos all
improved on their initial ranks between 1940 and 1970, whereas
Yucatan, Quintana Roo, and Durango lost in relative status.
The Federal District retained the first rank at all times,
while Oaxaca remained at the bottom throughout the period
shown.
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Index of State Development,
1940-1970
195C 1970
Source: Unikel and Victoria, 1970, in Scott, 1982
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Scott (1982) points out that throughout the 1940-1970
period, eight of the fourteen most developed states were
geographically in the north, three of the others were in the
center (Federal District, Mexico, and Morelos), and one was in
the Pacific Southwest (Jalisco). In contrast, almost all of
the poorest states were in the South, and most of the states in
the intermediate category were geographically between these
extremes (p. 205).
Regional imbalance in Mexico is also associated with
relative disequilibrium in urbanization and industrial
concentration. Mexico City alone counted for over 30% of the
total urban (2500 inhabitants threshold) population of the
country in 1970 and for over 40% of rural-urban migrants
(Scott, 1982:215). Three of the most economically advanced
states alone -- the Federal District, Mexico and Nuevo Leon --
accounted in 1960 for 58.9% of the total value of manufacturing
output. In the same year, thirteen other states -- including
many of the poorest, contributed altogether only 7.2% of the
value of the industrial output (Lamadrid 1971:558).
Using Unikel and Victoria's index results as a measure of
regional development relative to the highest ranking state (the
Federal District), a clear tendency is shown toward increasing
disequilibrium during the 1940-70 period. The results
presented in Figure 3 indicate a marked tendency toward
disequilibrium in Baja California Norte, Durango, Queretaro and
Quintana Roo, and moderate tendency towards disequilibrium in
all other states with the exception of Nuevo Leon, Baja
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Index of Tendency
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Scott, 1982:209.
California Sur and Sonora, which showed a tendency toward
equilibrium. This suggests that Mexico appears to be a clear
case of national economic growth with great disparities in
regional development.
3. Purposes and Scope of This Study
Some literature on regional development suggests the
existence of an implicit trade-off between national economic
growth and regional development (i.e., Mera, 1967). As an
example, Hirschman's concept of unbalanced development -- which
recommends that public investment be directed to areas with
higher potential for growth (in order to achieve rapid national
economic progress) -- implicitly justifies regional
inequalities as a necessary cost for national development
(1958).
For the particular case of Mexico, David Barkin and
Timothy King (1970) state:
A more effective regional policy must also include some
restraints on investment elsewhere or positive
inducements to invest in the developing regions. Such
a policy would probably require some sacrifice of
economic growth in favor of achieving the objective of
regional balance. (p. 248)
In contrast, this study is aimed at exploring the
possibility that a developing country such as Mexico need not
accept a lower rate of national growth in order to minimize
regional disparities. Accordingly, this analysis of the
Papaloapan Project is carried out primarily to increase our
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understanding of the impact that infrastructure expenditures
may have on regional economic development, and not only for the
purpose of assessing the Papaloapan Commission's activities.
Although empirical verification is severely handicapped by
the difficulties of isolating the impact of any one factor from
the many elements involved (i.e., impact of infrastructure
investment versus fiscal incentives, etc.), this inquiry
attempts to demonstrate the significance of Mexico's
infrastructure investment policy in shaping the spatial
development of the country, and to explore the distributional
consequences of that policy. This study focuses on the
Papaloapan Commission's activities from its initiation in 1947
to 1970 -- the last year to which data on the Commission's
expenditures was available to the author -- and on the regional
development and industrial policies of Mexico.
Section II presents a "core-periphery" conceptual
framework of analysis in order to account for existing regional
development imbalances and spatial disequilibrium in Mexico,
and the role of public investment in regional economic
development is discussed.
Section III presents first the general pattern of the
Mexican government expenditures and investment at the National
level, throughout the 1940-70 period, in order to elucidate how
those expenditures may have contributed to or reinforced the
process of spatial polarization of the country, while
supporting the process of national economic growth. Secondly,
this Section explores -- through a multiple regression exercise
-18-
-- a thesis posed by Hansen (1965) which states that regional
differences in income can be lessened if the specific type of
infrastructure investment applicable to each region is
considered.
To inquire into the extent to which the Papaloapan
Commission's activities fulfilled national development
objectives versus the Papaloapan River Basin population's
development needs, Section IV presents first a discussion of
the contributing factors to the creation of the Papaloapan
Commission in 1947 and the orientation of its activities.
Then, the stated role and structure of the Papaloapan
Commission are described, followed by an analysis of the
Commission's plans, projects, pattern of expenditures, and
factors affecting its performance.
Finally, in Section V, the Papaloapan Project is
reconsidered after evaluation criteria are defined. From that
assessment, the study looks at the distribution of benefits and
costs derived from the Commission's activities, as accruing to
the nation as a whole, the three regions involved (Veracruz,
Oaxaca, and Puebla) and the two geographical areas of the river
basin, namely the upper and the lower Papaloapan. These
benefits and costs can be distributed as gains and losses with
territorial consequences among the "core" and the "periphery."
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II. PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH AND
DEVELOPMENT: A CORE-PERIPHERY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Regional imbalances in developing countries (LDCs) are
marked, and primacy of one or a few cities over the rest of the
territory is the predominant pattern (Renaud, 1981; El-Shakhs,
1972). Therefore, a key issue of regional development policy
in LDCs is to elucidate why regions experience such markedly
different rates of economic and social development, and under
what conditions those growth rates would tend to converge or
diverge. However, given the complexity of interrelated forces
shaping spatial development, there is still no satisfactory
comprehensive model of regional growth, and existing analyses
of specific components of growth are largely constrained by
conditional assumptions that in practice often lead to
contradictory conclusions.
It is generally hypothesized that during the early stages
of a country's development growth will occur unevenly,
polarizing in a few favored locations or even one primary city.
Due to limited resources in LDCs, it is also argued that
regional imbalances and spatial concentration of growth are
necessary conditions for national economic development. At
later stages of development, some theorists foresee a
transition to a more equal diffusion of growth, while others
predict sustained concentration.
This Section surveys some models of regional economic
growth and development in order to establish a conceptual
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framework of analysis that may account for existing regional
development imbalances and spatial disequilibrium in Mexico,
and particularly for the relative underdevelopment of the
Papaloapan basin.
The focus of the survey is determined by the agricultural
characteristics of the Papaloapan area,the infrastructure
investment nature of the Papaloapan Project, and the unbalanced
pattern of Mexico's resource allocation and decision-making
between the Federal District and the rest of the nation. Thus,
elements of staple, neoclassical, cumulative causation, and
dependency theory are considered as well as the
"core-periphery" formulation of regional development. Emphasis
is placed on the impact of public infrastructure investment on
the polarization-diffusion of growth and development between
rural and urban areas and between regions within the same
country.
The staple theory of regional development claims that
market forces, left to themselves, will in the long run achieve
a self-equilibrating spatial diffusion of development. For
North (1955),, the growth of a region lies in the success of its
"export base." In his view, income deriving from the initial
export of agricultural staples generates multiplier effects
that eventually facilitate autonomous diversification into
secondary and tertiary activities to satisfy domestic demand,
some of which, in turn, become exporters themselves. For
North, given two regions, one primarily agricultural and
sparsely populated and the other industrial and heavily
-21-
populated, the first will initially buy its manufactured goods
from the second; but in a later stage--assuming a favorable
balance of trade--the agricultural region will start to produce
its own manufactured goods.
This inducement of regional production resulting from the
increased activity of the export sector takes place through
three "economic linkage effects": (i) backward linkage (i.e.,
local production of agricultural implements, development of
transportation facilities for the collection of the staples,
etc.); (ii) forward linkage (i.e., further local processing of
raw materials); and (iii) final demand linkage (i.e.,
inducements to invest in domestic industries producing consumer
goods for factors in the export sector). According to this
theory, the export-base shapes the growth of nodal centers
which provide trading, banking, and other specific services.
Initial concentration of subsidiary industry in a nodal point
becomes self-reinforcing due to internal and external
economies, that give a competitive advantage to the center over
the surrounding periphery. An important source of external
economies are transportation and other infrastructure
facilities which once in place to serve the staple industry
will lower costs to other potential industries and may well
stimulate further investment on that account. North assumes
that a freely functioning market economy results in a wider
dispersion of production and in spatially self-equilibrating
growth. He overlooks, however, the fact that the demand for
manufactured goods tends to be higher than for agricultural
-22-
products (Engels' law). Thus, manufacturing regions may
actually grow faster than agricultural regions, leading to
concentration of growth in more progressive regions. North
also overlooks the fact that a prime determinant of local
economic growth is the size of the domestic market, which is,
in turn, dependent on the level of the aggregate level of
income and its distribution. The demand pattern of a
plantation-agriculture region does not provide a large enough
market for mass-produced consumer goods due to its skewed
income and assets distribution, and therefore is unlikely to
stimulate domestic industry. Consequently, entrepreneurs invest
instead in the region with the highest economic potential, that
is the center, to the detriment of the periphery.
From a neoclassical perspective, Borts (1960) suggested
that disequilibrium between regions will induce productive
factors to shift in such a way as to restore equilibrium.
According to his view, in a perfectly functioning free market
the constant search for profit and high wages would shift
capital to low-wage regions, increasing wages there; while
labor will move to high-wage regions, increasing returns to
capital there, until a point of equilibrium is reached between
the two sets of regions. Thus, growth in a national
space-economy should in the long-run be self-equilibrating.
The development of the infrastructural system (i.e., roads) is
critical for this process to take place.
Richardson (1973), among others, has pointed out the lack
of validity in the real world of most of the assumptions of
neoclassical models of regional growth. The assumption of
perfect competition is untenable in the space-economy, because
space and distance limit competition and give a degree of
monopoly protection. Among the obstacles to "perfect mobility"
of capital, we have the lumpy nature of investment, which
cannot adjust effectively to small changes in rates of return.
In addition, the fact that industrial relocation is costly may
prevent the initiative for taking advantage of any potential
gains from alternative sites. In addition, it has been widely
argued that capital and labor do not solely respond to the rate
of profit and the wage rate (Richardson, 1973).
For the particular case of developing economies, the facts
contradict even more the theory. What has been observed about
advanced and lagging regions in most LDCs is cumulative
unbalanced growth. Continuous inflow of capital investment and
selective immigration to the core are also common phenomena.
Also, the insufficient development of the infrastructure system
and the lack of amenities and complementary services are among
the reinforcing factors that foster concentration rather than
dispersion of economic growth throughout the space-economy.
Another criticism of the neoclassical models of regional
growth is that they cannot incorporate social and political
factors nor the spatial effects of government policy, which are
significant in developing countries.
Another school of thought argues to the contrary that
market forces, through a circular process of cumulative
causation, inherently tend to spatial polarization and income
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divergence. According to this thesis, a change in one factor
(i.e., infrastructure expenditures) induces the others to
change in such a way that these secondary changes support the
first movement which further propels the system in the same
direction as the original change (Myrdal, 1957:13). Myrdal
(1957) contends that progressive regions (i.e., major cities,
ports) that develop trading links to the outside world, in
general acquire strong locational advantages, facilitating
further industrial expansion, thus setting in motion the
pattern of spatial polarization. Other forces act on the
market economy as well to increase rather than decrease the
inequalities between regions. On the one hand, migrations from
backward regions make the advanced regions more attractive for
capital investment by lowering wages, increasing the number of
consumers and thus inducing more investment and further
expansion. On the other hand, the backward regions are
penalized by selective labor migration, which reduces the
potential productivity of those regions. As migration
proceeds, the size of the local market is decreased and new
investments there are discouraged. Consequently, investments
tend to occur in the same progressive regions where the
previous round of capital investment took place. Government
policy, according to this view, promotes further concentration
patterns by generating growth in current centers of production.
In sum, Myrdal maintains that movements of capital, labor,
and goods, contrary to what is believed in equilibrium theory,
are precisely the media through which the cumulative process
-25-
evolves--upwards in the lucky regions and downwards in the
unlucky ones. Myrdal acknowledged that progressive regions
would "spread" development into their hinterlands, but
anticipated that the "backwash" supporting the concentration of
growth would be stronger and more persistent. A limitation of
the theory of cumulative causation is that it is not presented
as a formal model with a spatial-temporal framework that takes
into account how the backwash and spread forces operate.
Another body of opinion accepts the proposition that
growth will initially occur unevenly but holds that ultimately
self-equilibrating forces will prevail (Friedmann, 1973;
Hirschman, 1958). The central assumption of these theorists is
that growth in space implies a change in the relative
importance of concentration and dispersion forces over space
and through time. In addition, these two forces pulling in
opposite directions are always present. An increase in one set
of forces leads to a decline in the importance of the other,
and consequent changes in relative weights would represent the
evolution of spatial development patterns within a
core-periphery interaction system. Throughout the spatial
development process, the forces of concentration are most
powerful and persistent at first, but eventually concentration
forces are weakened, whereas deconcentration forces are
strengthened.
Friedmann, in his center/periphery paradigm of regional
development, outlines four stages in the process of adjustment
from uneven growth to equilibrium (1973): (i) pre-industrial
society with local independent centers; (ii) arrival of
industrialization, for which polarization of growth appears in
one or two centers through a center-periphery relationship;
(iii) integration of other regions into the economy during
which secondary centers become self-sustaining; and (iv)
post-industrial stage, in which the space economy becomes an
interdependent system of regions structured around an urban
hierarchy. Friedmann views the national space economy as a
system that reflects a dominant and persistent pattern of
non-reciprocal exchange relations among cities and regions. In
effect, the core-periphery relationship is a system in which
resources (labor, capital, raw materials, etc.) flow from the
periphery to the core and in which the rate and pattern of
development in the periphery is controlled by the core so as to
further the core's economic, political and social interests.
Friedmann (1966) points out that the center/periphery's
asymmetrical relation of dominance/dependence is articulated
through four major interaction processes: decision-making and
control, capital flow, innovation diffusion, and migration.
Corresponding to the operation of each process is a spatial
pattern of the center-periphery. Economic activities
(investment) and migration determine the location and
settlement patterns of the center-periphery, and innovation
diffusion and decision-making determine the socio-cultural
spatial pattern of the center-periphery. These combine to form
the spatial organization of the society.
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The trickle down and polarization effects of Hirschman's
(1958) "North-South" model of unbalanced growth are close to
the migration and investment processes of Friedmann's
core-periphery theory. According to Hirschman, there is a need
for the emergence of some growing points that can insure
further growth through external economies of agglomeration.
Thus, public infrastructure investment should be directed to
the most promising regions. Hirschman also indicates that the
trickling down of northern progress results from an increase of
northern purchases and investments in the South. The North may
also absorb unemployed labor of the South and thereby raise the
marginal productivity of labor and per capita consumption
levels in the South. On the other hand, Hirschman himself
recognizes that southern activities in manufacturing and
exports may become depressed as a result of northern
competition. Besides, Hirschman states that northern progress
may "denude the South of its key technicians and managers as
well as of the more enterprising young men" (p. 188).
Friedmann's analysis predicts that the core-periphery
relationship eventually breaks down, as a result of the
tensions that tend to build up from the "ever more visible
discrepancies in the rates of expansion and modernization
between core and periphery." However, this is not an
established fact. On the contrary, the polarization may
persist as long as investors find it more "satisfying" to
locate in familiar locations; as long as the external benefits
of urban agglomeration outweigh differential costs in wages and
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transport; or as long as core elites coopt or repress the
demands of the elite from the periphery (Friedmann, 1973).
Hirschman also sees that the periphery may eventually be
integrated into the national economy. This may happen,
Hirschman states,either through the trickle down effects of
free play of market forces, or if not, through deliberate
government intervention in response to economic pressures.
Friedmann's conceptual core-periphery formulation emerges as a
nascent theory of polarized development, which will ultimately
cover not only the narrow range of economic variables, but also
explicitly social, political, and cultural development in
geographic space. Spatial dispersion or polarization reversal
may be a valuable concept in regional development since spatial
polarization processes are prevalent in developing countries
(Renaud, 1981; El-Shakhs, 1972). The center-periphery
theoretical propositions, however, are not formulated in the
form of a testable hypothesis to account for when and how
spatial dispersion of economic growth may take place.
While for some theorists (e.g., Alonso, 1968), the
persistence of polarization in countries at an intermediate
stage of development is attributed to impediments in the free
functioning of market forces, imperfect information, economies
of agglomeration that outweigh differential costs, etc.,
dependency theorists (e.g., Frank, 1966; Dos Santos, 1970)
argue that regional underdevelopment and unbalanced rural-urban
growth are not due merely to structural rigidities within a
developing nation. According to this school of thought those
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imbalances arise from the same historical processes that
integrate the national economy into the world capitalist
system. Development and underdevelopment, as Frank sees it,
are two sides of the same coin: the one cannot take place
without the other. The leading cities of the poorer countries
are merely links in a chain of satellites and metropolises,
through which economic surplus is siphoned off from backward
regions to wealthy capitals in the world outside. According to
this perspective, regional underdevelopment takes place through
a process of "internal colonialism" (Hechter, 1975) "since each
nation has its own dominant center and its own dominated
periphery."
The concept of "dependency" in the interregional context
may be defined as
a conditioning situation in which the economies of one
group of regions are conditioned by the development and
expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence
. . . becomes a dependent relationship when some
regions can expand through self-impulsion while others,
being in a dependent position, can only expand as a
reflection of the dominant regions, which may have
positive or negative effects on their immediate
development.
(Dos Santos, 1940, p. 231)
In most developing countries, rural sectors came to depend on
domestic urban sectors, while urban sectors, in turn, depended
on the external economy. Thus, these two center-peripheral
relations are interdependent, intertwined, and inseparable in
their causes and consequences. The peripheral culture has been
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underdeveloped by a process of internal colonialism directed by
the national core. In these ways, the pattern of inequality
already laid down seems to continue, and national development
seems to be sustained by center-periphery exploitation.
Dependency theory emphasizes the outward flow of capital,
labor, and other resources which create the underdevelopment of
the periphery. For these theorists, railroad and road networks
and harbors are the means that facilitate this flow of
resources while allowing external producers to reach the local
market more easily, to the detriment of periphery's consumers.
Dependency theory can be criticized because it offers a
one-sided explanation of underdevelopment which does not do
justice to the complexity of the problems tied to the concept
of underdevelopment. Dependency theory cannot account for why
some dependent nations and regions are more or less prosperous,
while others are poor.
From their particular perspective and assumptions, the
above - surveyed theories attempt to explain concentrated
regional growth as a result of the interaction of a variety of
social, economic, and behavioral factors. A recurrent role in
those theories is played by infrastructure investments which
either provide external economies, foster the diffusion of
innovations, or "facilitate the exploitation of the periphery."
Many of the postulates of the above theories do not fit
the facts of developing countries, and thus their conclusions
are not valid. Inherent limitations of each of the theories
were outlined above.
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This study adopts the "core-periphery" paradigm of
regional development in its search for an explanation of the
unbalanced spatial growth patterns of Mexico. The focus of
this inquiry will be on public infrastructure investment
decisions, since as can be inferred from the previous
discussion, infrastructure development may catalyze the
interaction among the processes of the core-periphery model
(investment, factor migration, decision-making and control, and
innovation diffusion) which according to its formulation create
the spatial organization of the society.
In the direction of spatial dispersion of economic growth,
investment in communication facilities may foster the diffusion
of innovation in the periphery, while the spatial integration
resulting from road and other transport facilities would
release untapped productive potential there, speeding the
diffusion of social and economic benefits and opportunities.
By the same token, public investment in urban infrastructure in
the periphery may attract private investment that will nurture
economic growth efforts there, and this growth in the periphery
may prevent out-migration of capital and skilled people, thus
stimulating further growth. In the initial stages of
development, however, enlarged infrastructure facilities may
facilitate the expansion of dominance mechanisms for resource
extraction and control of the periphery for the benefit of the
core, thus contributing to polarization (Friedmann, 1973).
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III. MEXICO: INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT ALLOCATION AND
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1. Investment Planning and Regional Development in Mexico
Throughout modern history the Mexican state has fulfilled
the function of the primary dynamic agent of development.
Accordingly, it has concerned itself with creating the
necessary infrastructure and basic industries, and obtaining
external economies for private capital investment.
The emphasis of Mexico's investment pragmatically placed
"on those sectors that would give the greatest impulse to
economic development" (Romero Kolbeck, 1967:180) is not a new
phenomenon; it has been a constant feature of Mexico's policy
as early as the 1930's, as quoted by Shafer (1966:103):
"From 1939 through 1959 in each year more than three-fourths of
gross public investment went to the preferred sectors:
irrigation, energy development (electric power, petroleum), and
transportation."
Because Mexico is a market economy, comprehensive planning
has never existed there. The limited national planning of the
country consisted until very recent years of a list of projects
to implement. Most of the government agencies or commissions
in charge of planning activities were created for the very
purpose of funds allocation and control rather than to direct
the diverse economic activities and sectors towards a unified
specific development goal (5).
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Romero Kolbeck (1960:498) points out that in Mexico, at
least up to the year 1953,
. . .the public investment policy was basically
founded in a series of isolated policies for each
sector or type of project under consideration. Thus,
for example, for water resources, the Ministry for
Water Resources dedicated all its efforts towards
realizing the largest number of projects in accordance
with its ideas about the problem of irrigation;
. . .in short, each federal government dependency,
public works constructor, or each decentralized
organization or state enterprise, undertook its
construction work, paying attention mostly to what they
considered the best policy in their fields, without
relating it to the rest of the public works or without
thought that the policy to be followed should be
subordinated to the general public investment policy,
which, in turn, should be adjusted to the total
recommended volume of public investment or be
compatible with the economic development of the nation
and, in particular, with the monetary stability. (6)
Virtually all government policies have had an implicit or
explicit impact on Mexico's regional economic development. The
policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI), as an
example, which provided the mainspring of economic development
in Mexico over the years following World War II, has been a
major impetus behind the accelerated pace of urbanization. ISI
favored urban areas to the disadvantage of rural areas, mainly
because most manufacturing of consumer goods were located at
the centers of greatest economic potential, and especially the
Federal District.
Supporting policies to the industrialization process have
also contributed to shaping the spatial pattern of the country.
Subsidized wage and tariff rates (i.e., water, diesel,
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electricity, and railroad freight) in the Federal District have
enhanced the attraction there for the location of economic
activity.
Up to the year 1970, Mexico did not have an explicit
policy of regional development that attempted the territorial
distribution of income growth. The regional aspect of planning
had been approached mostly by means of river-basin commissions,
such as the Papaloapan Commission, responsible for physical
projects and land colonization, but not for regional economic
planning.
Among government policies with explicit spatial
objectives, the Ley de Fomento de Industrias Nuevas y
Necesarias, started in the 1940's, offered tax-exemptions for
industrial development. Between 1940 and 1960 almost all
states introduced tax exemption laws. These fiscal incentives
were outweighed by the effect of the above - mentioned
subsidized tariffs of the Federal District (Mendoza Berrueto,
1969). The tax exemptions offered by the Federal District
constituted a loss of revenue because industries were prone to
locate there anyway due to the advantageous wage and tariff
policies (Scott, 1982).
Other policies with explicit spatial impact have included
the Fondo de Garantia a la Pequena y Mediana Industria aimed at
providing credit for the development of new industry. This
program showed mixed results between 1953 and 1970. Some
10,000 credits were awarded but the regional distribution of
those credits favored the Federal District and the State of
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Mexico; i.e., in 1961-62 the Federal District attracted 48% of
all credits, and although by 1969-70 its share had fallen to
23%, the average size of credit there remained relatively large
(Scott, 1982:109).
Up to the 1970's, Ramos Boyoli and Richter (February 1976)
recount that public investments were not used as an explicit
instrument of policy for equitable regional development. These
authors indicate that from 1959-1970 (there are no data on the
geographic distribution of public expenditure before 1959) the
richer states received more funds proportionately.
Furthermore, the regional distribution of investment on social
infrastructure was quite unequal, favoring the northern richer
states and the Federal District, while traditionally poor
states (Oaxaca, Chiapas, Guerrero) received few funds in this
category.
The inequality in the spatial allocation of public
infrastructure investment can be appreciated by looking at
Table 1. This table reveals that for transport, power, and
water investments, the central region received indeed the
largest share of total outlays, both in 1960 and 1970, most of
which went to the Federal District. On a per capita base, the
Northwest and Northeast regions have received consistently more
funds for infrastructure. The Federal District, despite its
large concentration of population, has received per capita
funds for infrastructure above the national average. Table 1
also shows the investments received by the Papaloapan basin
states in relation to national averages.
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Table 1
Distribution of Federal Public Investment per Capita
By Region, 1960 and 1970*
(Transport, Power, and Water)
1960 1970
Investment Percentage of Investment Percentage of
per Capita Total Investment per Capita Total Investment
Northwest (7  3.22 10.1 4.56 10.0
North Central 1.47 8.5 1.89 6.3
North East 4.31 18.4 6.22 17.3
South West 1.22 10.4 1.71 8.9
Central 1.79 31.9 2.80 33.3
(Federal District) (2.91) (20.1) (4.88) (20.1)
(Puebla) (1.40) ( 3.9) (0.73) ( 1.2)
South East 2.07 20.6 3.82 24.1
(Oaxaca) (0.77) ( 1.9) (1.68) ( 2.2)
(Veracruz) (2.70) (10.4) (4.79) (11.9)
Nationwide 2.02 100.0 3.15 100.0
Data Source: Censo General de la Poblacion; Scott, 1982:112-15.
*in pesos of 1960
I
As pointed out in the Introduction, Mexico's pattern of
regional development shows a tendency towards disequilibrium.
The Introduction also highlighted the fact that most of the
advanced states of the country are located in the northern and
central regions, while almost all the poorest states are
located in the south. The above-described regional allocation
of public infrastructure investment also reveals a pattern of
concentration in some favored regions and states.
The geographical coincidence of regional development and
infrastructure investment suggests the thesis of this study,
that the patterns of territorial use and regional development
imbalances in Mexico have been shaped to a large extent, or
reinforced, by the cumulative effect of the country's
infrastructure development policy.
2. Infrastructure Investment and Regional Development: A
Multivariate Analysis of Mexico
Hirschman (1958:190) indicates that "the most obvious
manner in which economic policy affects the rates of growth of
different parts of a country is through the regional allocation
of public investment." These external economic resources may
enter either as productive investments, social development
projects, or physical infrastructure construction. In this
regard, Scott (1982) points out that national development
policy, sectoral planning, and spatial development planning all
are linked to each other through investment projects (such as a
road or a water system). He emphasizes the often-forgotten
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fact that all investments have specific locations within
regions and are in or near cities. Hirschman himself
distinguishes three principal patterns of allocation:
dispersal, concentration on growing areas, and attempts to
promote the development of backward areas. This classification
is related to the impact that investments may have on different
regional settings.
For instance, it is expected that provision of Social
Overhead Capital investment (SOC) (8) in privileged provinces
or boom towns of developing countries "will lead to beneficial
repercussions," affirms Hirschman, "since in such regions many
entrepreneurs are always on the brink of investment decisions
and will therefore be pushed over it by an improvement in cost
and revenue outlook such as is provided by good SOC facilities"
(1958:95).
On the other hand, Hirschman himself indicates that the
channeling of large-scale expenditures toward the
underprivileged areas of a country entails a high degree of
danger of misguided investment, this being so because of the
weakness of its entrepreneurship and the purely "permissive"
character of the inducement mechanisms set in motion by those
investments (Hirschman, 1958:194-195).
What should then be the appropriate pattern of public
investment allocation: dispersed, or concentrated; and if the
latter, should it be directed to growing or to backward areas?
Furthermore, what kind of investment or combination of projects
should be implemented?
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Many developmental strategists have observed the
relationship between infrastructure investment in different
regions and their income levels. Hansen (1965) hypothesized
that the impact of infrastructure investment can be significant
but will depend on: (a) the economic characteristics of the
region in which the investment takes place; and (b) the type of
infrastructure investment. According to Hansen's hypothesis,
Economic Overhead Capital investment (EOC) should be directed
toward what he calls "intermediate" regions, while Social
Overhead Capital investment (SOC) (9) should be directed toward
"lagging" regions (10). This hypothesis rests on an economic
assessment of marginal benefits and marginal costs. For the
lagging regions, for instance, initial excess EOC capacity is
not justified, as more profitable alternatives exist in the
intermediate regions.
As Hansen (1965) notes, moreover:
The SOC needs of lagging regions are relatively great
and their SOC equipment is the least well developed;
thus marginal productivity considerations would favor
concentrating SOC in lagging regions rather than in
areas well equipped in this regard. Insofar as
possible, public outlays should aim at adapting the
population for employment in activities with
substantial prospects for future expansion. (p. 12)
In addition, the appropriate investment strategy in each
region depends on a time factor (Table 2). In phase 1,
congested regions are characterized by too much EOC and SOC,
and concomitant productive plant and equipment (Direct
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Table 2
Phases of Regional Growth
According to Investment Activity
Nature of Public and
Private Investment
Phase Type of Region Activity
1 Congested Overexpanded OC* and DPA**
Intermediate Deficient EOC
Lagging Deficient SOC
2 Congested Public controls on expansion of DPA
and concomitant OC
Intermediate Excess EOC capacity
Lagging Excess SOC capacity
3 Congested Public controls on expansion of DPA
and concomitant OC
Intermediate EOC and DPA approach optimal levels,
inducing SOC expansion
Lagging Balanced growth of SOC, EOC and DPA
*Overhead capital: EOC - Economic Overhead Capital
SOC - Social Overhead Capital
**Direct Productive Activities
Source: Hansen, 1965:13
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Productive Activities, DPA). In phases 2 and 3, controls are
placed on further expansion of economic activity in this
region. Furthermore, the government can actively encourage
decentralization by locating its own agencies in intermediate
or lagging regions.
In phase 1, intermediate and lagging regions are deficient
in EOC and SOC, respectively. With regard to the intermediate
region, Hansen (1965:11) notes that "it is reasonable to assume
unbalanced growth will be generated by excess EOC capacity."
This will induce DPA and, in turn, further EOC. As optimal
levels of EOC and DPA are reached, additional and complementary
SOC is induced (phase 3).
However, after the initial SOC investments, Hansen
suggests a, policy of balanced growth (phase 3) , primarily
designed to stem large out-migration of persons who benefited
from the initial SOC. Such policy measures include balanced
growth of EOC, SOC, and DPA, the stimulation of saving and its
investment locally, and the transfer of government agencies to
these areas.
Hansen's hypothesis has some clear economic policy
implications, given that it can be used as a mechanism for
optimizing the regional allocation of public resources. The
hypothesis suggests that a country under certain conditions, as
highlighted by Looney and Frederiksen (1981:295), need not
necessarily accept a lower rate of national growth in order to
minimize regional disparities. Rather, these same authors
explain, by concentrating EOC expenditures in intermediate
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regions and SOC expenditures in lagging regions, the implicit
trade-off between growth and minimizing differences in income
need not exist.
Looney and Frederiksen (1981) tested Hansen's hypothesis
for the case of Mexico by means of a multiple-regression
analysis, and their results tend to confirm the Hansen thesis:
economic overhead capital has had its greatest impact on Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in "intermediate" regions while social
overhead capital has had its greatest impact in "lagging"
regions. (A test for causality indicates that investment
precedes income growth.) A critical review of Looney and
Frederiksen's article was carried out by this author, mainly in
regard to the way the infrastructure variables were specified.
The results are presented in.Appendix A of this study.
These earlier results lend credence to the thesis that
regional differences in income can be lessened (or that
regional growth can be enhanced) if policy makers consider the
specific type of public investment applicable to each region.
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IV. THE PAPALOAPAN RIVER BASIN PROJECT
The Papaloapan river project, initiated by President
Miguel Aleman in 1947, was the first action of the so-called
"March to the Sea" policy which looked for the development of
Mexico's tropical zone. This policy was outlined in 1941 by
Avila Camacho, the predecessor of Aleman in the presidency.
Awareness of the agricultural production limitations of the
central part of Mexico, of the future food requirements of the
country, and of the resource potential of the Basin's lands,
was among the factors conditioning Aleman's newly created
policy of colonization.
Early in his presidential period, Aleman elevated the
former national irrigation commission to ministerial rank. The
newly created ministry of hydraulic resources (SRH) became a
major recipient of federal budget funds. Table 3 shows the
jump in per capita expenditures devoted to irrigation works
during the Aleman administration. The table also shows the
greater emphasis that irrigation has received as compared to
agriculture development programs.
From Table 4, it becomes evident that during the Aleman
and Ruiz Cortines administration irrigation projects were more
strongly supported than before and after: approximately nine
and eleven thousand hectares per month were brought into
production through irrigation during those two presidential
periods.
The purpose of Table 4 in this study, however, is to show
the disproportionate emphasis that large irrigation projects
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Table 3
Average Annual Expenditures per Capita,
by Presidential Term and by Policy Emphasis
(in Pesos of 1950)
President Irrigation Agriculture Total Ratio
(a) (b) Irrigation a/b& Agricult.
Cardenas 4.06 1.91 5.97 2.1
1935-40
Avila Camacho 6.44 2.42 8.86 2.7
1941-46*
Aleman 10.58 3.18 13.76 3.3
194 7-52**
Ruiz Cortines 12.63 2.58 15.21 4.9
1953-58**
Lopez Mateos 11.58 3.46 15.04 3.3
1959-63 **
Data obtained from (Wilkie, 1970:130-135).
* National Irrigation Commission
** Ministry of Hydraulic Resources
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Table 4
Land Irrigation 1935-1964 (Thousands of Hectares)*
Period Irrigation Works Large Total Average Ratio
for Rural Irrigation Construction b/a
Development Works per Month
(a) (b)
1935-1940 N.A. N.A. 118 1.7
(Cardenas)
1941-1946 N.A. N.A. 549 7.6 --
(Avila Camacho)
1947-52 146 479 625 8.7 3.28
(Aleman)
1953-58 149 610 759 10.5 4.09
(Ruiz Cortines)
1959-64 110 134 244 3.4 1.21
(Lopez Mateos)
(*) Figures are rounded to the
Data obtained from (Wilkie,
closest thousand.
1970:198; and BNCE, 1976:152-153).
received under Miguel Aleman and Ruiz Cortines as opposed to
irrigation works for rural development. it is under these
favorable conditions for irrigation that the Papaloapan project
was begun. in addition, it should be mentioned that Aleman,
more than any other president during the entire 1930-60 period,
de-emphasized federal support of agricultural credit. Cortines
spent 4.13 pesos (in 1950 prices) per capita on agricultural
credit (the highest in the period), while Aleman in his turn
spent only 1.05 pesos per capita on this same category (Wilkie,
1967:139).
1. The Papaloapan River Basin
The Papaloapan River Basin consists of an area of
approximately ,46,000 square kilometers, comprising portions of
the states of Oaxaca (49%), Veracruz (39%), and Puebla (12%).
The Papaloapan Basin includes two main geographical areas: the
lower basin or coastal zone, and the upper basin or mountainous
zone.
At the time the Papaloapan project was initiated, a
predominantly rural population of over one million people lived
in the Basin, and at least nine separate Indian languages were
spoken in the area. Oaxaca was in 1950 a heavily Indian state.
According to Cline (1962:96), 48% of the Oaxacan population
spoke either only their native language or were bilingual. The
same situation occurred in 21% of Puebla's population, and in
14.7% of that of Veracruz. Approximately 70% of the
upper-basin population were Indian, while only 15% of the
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lower-basin people were considered to be Indian (Poleman,
1964:52).
Sugar cane and pineapple have been the main crops of the
coastal area, while coffee has been the commercial crop of the
upper basin. However, over two-thirds of the upper basin's
arable land has been devoted to subsistence crops, largely
corn.
When the Papaloapan project started, the main land-tenure
pattern of the upper basin was the small-holding of communally
owned lands; in the lower basin, the large plantation system
predominated. Winnie, Jr. (1956:193) indicates that by 1945,
42% of the lower Papaloapan Basin was distributed in holdings
of one-thousand hectares or more, of which twenty-seven
properties alone averaged eleven-thousand hectares each.
In the late 1940's, the highlands lacked roads and means
of transportation. The coffee production was taken to market
by pack animal. Partly due to this lack of transportation, a
chain of intermediaries and money-lenders was involved in
coffee commercialization (Flores de la Vega and Lopez, 1949).
The communication situation of the coastal zone was not as
bad as that of the highlands, but even the most accessible
parts of the lower basin had poor transportation facilities and
practically no all-weather roads. However, the
agriculturalists were able to mobilize their produce, either by
railroad, river barge, or ox-cart.
At the time the Papaloapan Commission started its
activities in the Basin, the region was producing one-fourth of
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the national total of refined sugar. "San Cristobal,"
operating in the lower area, was the largest sugar mill in
Mexico and one of the largest in the world.
Before the Papaloapan Project was launched, all urban and
semi-urban centers, as well as most of the non-agricultural
activities of the Basin, were located in the lower basin.
Also, only 3% of the Basin's agricultural land was irrigated,
all of which was located in the lowlands. Health facilities
were poor in the lower basin and non-existent in the highlands.
2. The Papaloapan River Commission
At the time of the Aleman presidency, the economy of
Mexico was growing at an average annual rate of 6%. However,
since at least a decade before, the rate of installed electric
capacity had been falling behind: it had increased by a mere
1% between the years 1937 and 1943. Thus, "during a period
when Mexico's economic development was receiving a big push,
electric power generation became an obstacle to growth"
(Kolbeck, 1967:206) (11).
The commitment of Aleman to support industrialization
resulted in the search for appropriate sites for hydro-electric
power generation. Thus, the need for the development of water
resources was a participatory factor for the creation in 1947
of the Papaloapan Commission. However, a major flood in 1944
along the Santo Domingo, a tributary of the Papaloapan River,
contributed more directly to initiate creation of the regional
commission in that area. As Barkin and King describe:
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In 1944 the worst recorded flood inundated some 200,000
hectares (half a million acres) , in addition to the
300,000 hectares or so that are flooded annually. Over
100 persons were killed and hundreds of them were made
homeless, and still more died from disease in the
unhealthy conditions that followed the flood.
Substantial economic loss resulted from this flood. Floods in
the lower basin occurred relatively often, for which the sugar
producers and agriculturalists petitioned the government on
each occasion to take some flood control measures.
In 1944, then-President Avila Camacho inspected the
flooded areas, and primary plans were initiated. It is then
that the official delimitation of the Basin area arose (12).
Miguel Aleman, a native of the lower part of the Basin and
a former Governor of Veracruz, was personally committed to the
Papaloapan Project, as his administration favored large
irrigation schemes in agriculture. According to Greenberg
(1970:23), the decision to elevate the National Irrigation
Commission to ministerial status and to initiate a series of
regional commissions had already been made by Aleman before he
took office (13).
Besides agricultural land expansion needs, the
hydro-electric requirements of the country and the irrigation
emphasis of the Aleman administration, as well as Aleman's
personal commitment to the sugar growers of the lower basin,
the Papaloapan project was started when Mexican civil
engineering professionals had achieved the expertise required
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by larger irrigation works. Ten and even twenty years before,
many Mexican engineers had been sent to the United States to
learn about land reclamation and irrigation (14).
The Papaloapan Commission conscientiously followed the
pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authority despite the fact
that it was not independent like the TVA. In fact, the
Commission was created as a dependent entity of the Ministry of
Hydraulic Resources (SRH). The Minister, who acted as
president of the Commission, reported directly to the President
of Mexico on this project. An executive Director (Vocal
Ejecutivo) was responsible for the Commission's activities.
The Papaloapan Commission was given the primary
responsibility for planning and coordinating the investments
to be made on the Papaloapan Basin. The Commission constituted
a technical-administrative organ to supervise the functioning
of all water-use and flood-control projects, irrigation works,
generating plants, water supply to centers of population,
sanitary engineering, communications, and transportation
including roads, railroads, telegraph and telephone services,
ports, and the like, and also to create and expand centers of
population. It was given power also to dictate measures
regarding agricultural, industrial, and colonization matters
touching upon the execution of projects for the integral
development of the Basin.
Many other government agencies besides the River
Commission were involved in the projects undertaken within the
Papaloapan Basin, among them, the National Colonization
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Commission created in 1946 to promote and supervise new
settlements in the area, and the National Indigenista Institute
created to take part in matters pertaining to relocation of
indigenous communities affected by the construction works of
the Commission.
Besides the Mexican Coffee Institute, mainly a
commercializing agency of the government, and the Ministries of
Education, Health, Agriculture, and Industry and Commerce, were
to be working within the Basin project under the coordination
of the Papaloapan Commission.
3. The Papaloapan River Program: Plans and Projects
From the content of its constitutive decree and the amount
of its early expenditures (Table 5), it is clear how ambitious
the plans of the Papaloapan integrated program were. This
program was considered the first major attempt to stimulate the
development of the humid tropical regions of Mexico and Latin
America
The original plans involved flood prevention and control
works for over a half-million hectares, irrigation for over 200
thousand hectares, and colonization promotion for over 400
thousand hectares (Ballesteros, et al., 1970:24). In the
Commission's initial plans were also various projects for
electric-power generation, a wide system of transport
facilities and access roads, urban improvement projects, and
education and sanitation works. Throughout the course of its
existence, the Papaloapan Commission underwent important
-52-
Table 5
Papaloapan Commission: Composition of Expenditures, 1947-1970
Category 1947-52 1953-58 1959-64 1965-70 TOTAL
HYDRAULIC WORKS 127.43 (100%) 185.990 (100%) 54.99 (100%) 59.59 (100%) 424.000 (100%)
Aleman Dam 118.621(93.0) 87.120 (46.8) 18.349 (33.4) 2.003 ( 3.4) 226.093 (53.3)
Flood Control 5.915 (4.6) 25.591 (13.7) 10.611 (19.3) 12.698 (21.3) 54.795 (12.9)
Irrigation 2.983 (2.4) 69.299 (39.5) 26.041 (47.3) 44.870 (24.7) 143.111 (33.8)
COMMUNICATIONS 62.739 (100%) 200.164 (100%) 28.246 (100%) 4.948 (100%) 296.098 (100%)
Roads 55.994 (89.2) 184.503 (92.2) 24.631 (87.2) 4.855 (98.1) .269.983 (91.2)
Bridges 6.021 ( 9.6) 14.881 (7.4) 3.491 (12) 0.063 ( 1.3) 24.456 ( 8.3)
Other 0.724 ( 1.2) 0.779 (0.4) 0.124 (0.4) 0.031 ( 0.6) 1.659 ( 0.5)
AGRICULTURE 4.828 27.678 5.346 15.902 53.754
SOBANIZA S C S 33.853 (100%) 82.878 (100%) 38.301 (100%) 62.638 (100%) 216.992 (100%)
Urban Infra- 21.374 (63.1) 21.072 (25.4) 19.089 (49.8) 51.662 (82.5) 113.631 (52.4)
structure*
Health & Sani- 7.300 (21.6) 10.840 (13.1) 6.213 (16.2) 5.350 ( 8.5) 29.703 (13.7)
Education 3.828 (11.3) 17.302 (13.1) 5.949 (15.5) 2.295 ( 3.7) 29.374 (13.5)
Resettlement 0.661 ( 4.0) 33.621 (19.7) 7.050 (18.5) 3.031 ( 5.3) 44.363 (20.4)
PLANNING,
DIRECTION & 41.686 (100%) 99.139 (100%) 45.565 (100%) 58.939 (100%) 245.328 (100%)
ADMINISTRATION
Planning 7.827 (18.8) 18.554 (18.7) 12.038 (26.4) 22.666 (38.4) 61.085 (24.9)
Di inistration 17.159 (41.2) 45.191 (45.6) 30.077 (66.0) 31.198 (52.9) 123.624 (50.1)
Other 16.700 (40.0) 35.394 (35.7) 3.450 ( 7.6) 5.075 ( 8.7) 60,619 (25.0)
TOTALS 269.857 591.849 172.449 202.018 1236.172
Note: b'igures are _tii
millions off pesos; totals
may not add because off
roundin'.
I,
wn
*Includes: electrification, water supply, and sewage and other urban public works.
Source: Commission del Papaloapan 1940-1970: Anios de Labores.
changes in its plans and activities orientation. This was to
some extent the result of changes in the external institutional
setting, translated into budgetary instability. Shifts in
projects and activities also occurred as a result of
difficulties encountered in the field.
Accordingly, four main phases of the Commission's
activities can be distinguished up to 1970. These phases and
their main projects and budget shares are summarized in Table
5.
The first phase of the Commission's activities
(1947-1952) , under the presidency of Miguel Aleman, was
characterized by a large operating budget and an emphasis on
economic expenditures. During this period most of the
expenditures were directed to the Aleman Dam (40% of the total)
and two main highways (23% in roads and bridges) , both
connecting Ciudad Aleman--which also was built during this
period. Sanitary engineering (2.7%), school construction
programs (1.4%),, and agricultural development programs (1.8%)
received only an insignificant amount of the period's total
expenditures (Table 5 and Table 6).
The second phase of the Papaloapan Project (1953-1958)
during the presidency of Ruiz Cortines (also a native and
former Governor of Veracruz) can be divided into two parts
according to the budget allocated to the project. The first
part (1953-1956) was characterized by a large and constant
budget, while in the second, the operating and capital budget
was substantially reduced.
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Table 6
Papaloapan Commission: Nature of Expenditures, 1947-1970
Category 1947-52 1953-58 1959-64 1965-70 TOTAL
Hydraulic 127.430 (47.2) 185.990 (31.4) 54.990 (31.9) 59.59 (29.5) 424.000 (34.3)Works
Communica- 62.739 (23.2) 200.164 (33.8) 28.246 (16.4) 4.948 (.2.5) 296.098 (23.9)t ions
Agriculture 4.828 ( 1.8) 27.678 ( 4.7) 5.346 ( 3.1) 15.902 ( 7.9) 53.754 ( 4.3)
Urbanization
and Social 33.853 (12.5) 82.878 (14.0) 38.301 (22.2) 62.638 (31.0) 216.992 (17.5)
Services
Planning,
Direction, 41.686 (15.3) 99.139 (16.1) 45.565 (26.4) 58.939 (29.1) 245.328 (20.0)and
Administration
TOTALS 269.857 (100%) 591.849 (100%) 172.449 (100%) 202.018 (100%) 1236.172 (100%)
Source: Comision del Papaloapan 1947-70: Anos de Labores
Note: Figures are in million pesos. Totals may not add because of rounding.
Numbers in parenthesis are percentages.
U'l
During the first period, the construction of the Miguel
Aleman Dam was continued, the construction of the Temascal
electric plant was initiated, and agricultural development
schemes (colonization and irrigation) were started. This
period ends with the appointment of a new Executive Director.
During the second part (1957-58) of this phase of the
Project's life, important changes in the activities of the
Commission appeared: agricultural development projects were
curtailed, while emphasis was given to road-building
activities. Poleman (1964:109) indicates that
In early 1957 the Commission's agricultural stations
were transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, and
many of its medico-sanitary operations to the Ministry
of Public Health; and its credit and colonization
operations were curtailed. During the remaining two
years of the Ruiz Cortines administration, the
Commission functioned mainly as a road-building agency;
over half its budget was allocated to that end.
It is in this phase that the irrigation and colonization
projects failed, due to the misconception of the irrigation
facilities and to the lack of support for the agricultural
settlements (15).
Phase 3 of the project (1959-1964), under the Lopez Mateos
administration, represented again a reorientation of the
Commission's activities, this time due to an even more drastic
reduction of the project's budget. In this period, almost no
new investment was made, and the Commission performed mainly
maintenance works. President Lopez Mateos' lack of personal
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interest in the project has been seen as a cause of the budget
cuts, but it is believed serious budgetary irregularities
contributed to it.
During the Lopez Mateos presidency practically all
non-irrigation functions of the Commission were transferred to
other agencies, either in the federal or local governments.
The road building program, for instance, which was sharply
reduced during this period, was assigned to the Ministry of
Communications and Public Works. Barkin and King (1970:101)
describe as follows the end of the active periods of the
Papaloapan Commission.
In no way completed, the project exists today [1970] in
a state of political suspension with a budget of less
than a fifth of that it once enjoyed, scarcely adequate
for the maintenance of works already constructed.
Plans to construct another dam, much needed to reduce
silting of the lower river, have been ready for many
years, but no work has been carried out. The
Commission still undertakes a considerable amount of
long-range planning for a day in which funds may again
become plentiful.
In the last phase of the project (1965-1970), under the
presidency of Diaz Ordaz, the Commission received a budget
slightly larger than in the previous administration. In this
period, planning, direction, and administration categories were
allocated a sum almost as large as that devoted to flood
control and irrigation.
New interest in the Papaloapan Commission arose in the
early 1970's. A Presidential decree of 30 August 1972 states
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that the Commission should formulate plans for the
industrialization of the area, giving special emphasis to the
development of public enterprises. This new interest on the
Papaloapan Basin has led to the elaboration of a socioeconomic
diagnostic of the Papaloapan area, to the design of a
preliminary plan for the industrialization of the basin
(NAFINSA-SRH, 1973), and to the elaboration of the input -
output matrix of the basin (Banco de Mexico, 1973). An
"Integrated Rural Development Project" funded by the World Bank
was underway in 1983.
4. The Papaloapan Commission's Achievement and Failures
The Papaloapan project consisted, in the 1970's, mainly of
flood control and electric-power generation through the Miguel
Aleman Dam and other small works, the construction of several
hundred kilometers of highway and roads, and a very reduced
irrigation program compared to the original objectives. In
addition, Ciudad Aleman was built to house the headquarters of
the Commission, but no other significant urban development
project was carried out. A few small education and sanitary
engineering projects were also built.
Throughout the period 1949-1970, many projects were
abandoned, while others were suspended for lack of financing.
Many projects were never initiated, and others which might have
contributed to the integrated development of the Basin area
were not even designed nor attempted. A more detailed
enumeration of the Commission's achievements and failures
follows.
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The main project of the Papaloapan Commission, the Aleman
Dam built on the Tonto River--and its complementary works--has
controlled the flooding of only 250 thousand hectares, while
the area needing protection is approximately 570 thousand
hectares, and involves not only the Tonto River but also the
Santo Domingo, the Tesechoacan, and the San Juan Evangelista.
In a 1968 publication about the basin situation, it is
indicated that "the floods have not been controlled
sufficiently . . . and there still exists the risk of
extraordinary river flows" (Bancomer, 1968a:61) (16). However,
according to this same publication, from 1947 to 1957 the
harvested area within the Basin was doubled (ibid., p. 62).
"The Aleman Dam was planned to provide supplemental
irrigation to 160,000 hectares," indicate Barkin and King
(1970:100), "without adequate study of whether this was
desirable or feasible." Consequently the Aleman Irrigation
District never really functioned. As Barabas and Bartolome
(1973:19) report,
Apparently there existed problems with the design of
the Miguel Aleman dam, such that it was not possible to
put the planned irrigation program into effect. The
Papaloapan Commission then turned to a system of
hydraulic pumps that extracted the water from the Tonto
River; however, its high cost and the lack of
maintenance of the pumps caused their rapid
deterioration and eventually, their inutility.
The Temascal electric-power plant started generating
electricity only in 1960, and rural electrification up to now
has reached only a small percentaqe of the Basin population.
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The Commission's road-building program was a spectacular
one. During the first phase of the project, two major roads
were constructed out of Ciudad Aleman, "one of them was a wide
first-class highway in spite of the economic insignificance of
the area of that time" (Barkin and King, 1970:100).
As part of the Commission's urban improvement programs,
"Ciudad Aleman was laid out for an eventual 150,000 inhabitants
although several well-established towns were situated nearby"
(Poleman, 1964:105). In fact, Tuxtepec, Oaxaca--situated close
to the boundary line between Oaxaca and Veracruz--and Ciudad
Aleman were only fifteen kilometers apart; but Ciudad Aleman
was built on the Veracruz side. Tuxtepec, Oaxaca, the district
seat, was already at the time of the project's commencement one
of the most important commercial centers in the area.
Despite the previously outlined importance of land
expansion for the country, colonization projects in the area
did not succeed. Poleman (1964:116) emphatically states, "The
most disappointing facet of the Papaloapan Project has been the
agricultural program . . . it can point to few concrete
achievements."
Even where started, irrigation was abandoned a few years
later due to high costs. The agricultural credit program
resulted in total failure with a great deal of money lost in
credit operations. The failure of the colonization schemes was
due to the inflexibility of the conditions given along with the
credit, and also lack of previous experimentation with possible
crop patterns. Poleman (1964:107) identifies as a source of
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failure the lack of understanding of the Basin environment:
". . .the agricultural potentials of the basin were taken
rather as a matter of faith. Even as this is written, a truly
detailed survey of the area's land resources remains to be
taken."
Among the planned but never executed works there were the
"Los Naranjos" and "Machapan" irrigation zones, for which the
Commission bought 20,000 and 1,400 hectares, respectively, but
on which irrigation facilities were never built. There were
plans to settle 1,500 families in these two zones, but only 497
were brought in, of which in the end only 200 stayed
(Ballesteros, et al., 1970:33-34).
The relocation of the Mazateco communities directly
affected by the dam flooding involved many social and economic
problems. The relocated families, for instance, were
compensated for their property losses with cash or lands. It
is alleged, however, that the lands received in compensation
were of inferior quality to the original ones. Because the
land was for many not of sufficient quality and extension even
for subsistence farming, a large proportion of families
abandoned the new colonies.
Four of the five designated zones for resettlement of the
Indian families had no access to lands being brought under
irrigation by the dam, indicate Barrabas and Bartolome
(1973:6-7). They also state that the resulting fragmentation
of the Mazatec population was not a consequence of insufficient
nearby land, but rather because the best lands had already been
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distributed to employees of the Commission or to influential
people who expected to benefit from the dam's irrigation
district. The displaced Mazatec did not receive irrigation or
electricity, and according to the above - mentioned authors,
roads are all but impassable due to lack of maintenance (p. 7).
More than 3,000 families were officially resettled, but
half of those displaced, at most, stayed in the zones planned
for them. The r-esettlement work lasted six years, from 1953 to
1959; however, even in 1967 some families were looking for a
permanent place to settle, while others were still waiting for
the compensation payments (Ballesteros, 1970:33). In sum, the
economic and social life of the displaced families was
seriously disrupted, without those people having been
integrated into the national economy and culture.
The educational works of the Commission were limited to
"cultural. brigades" that operated during the resettlement
preparation period and to the construction of school
classrooms. Health and sanitation undertakings were limited to
the provision of a few medical centers and rural dispensaries
and to the spraying of rural houses for malaria prevention, as
well as to the provision of safe drinking water to a few towns.
Only about 4% of the Commission's expenditures up to 1960 were
directed toward a sanitary engineering project.
* * * * * *
Among the benefits and costs derived by the nation as a
whole from the Papaloapan project, the following can be
identified:
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A benefit was the expansion of the national socioeconomic
interests over Basin territories, through transportation
facilities improvement. This allowed goods and services to be
brought in and out of the Basin area, and a closer interaction
of the federal government with the Papaloapan region.
Electric-power generation is also a benefit obtained from
the project (184,000 kw of electric power generation capacity.)
It opened the possibilities for a paper factory to be built in
Tuxtepec in 1960, and an aluminum plant in Veracruz in 1963.
The areas protected by flood control and the increases in the
harvested area and sugar production--though a benefit for the
region's agriculturalists--can also be included among the
nation's gains.
Barkin and King (1970:102) mention that according to the
estimates of the Commission, the flood savings obtained between
1950 and 1960 (apparently in 1944 prices) were 116 million
pesos. Barkin and King also indicate that the area harvested
for sugar production doubled in the decade 1947-1957, and that
the sugar production increased from 167,000 metric tons in
1947-59 to 317,000 metric tons in 1957-68 (ibidem).
Further, the Commission's activities and projects had a
direct economic impact on some sectors of the national economic
establishment: equipment and construction materials had to be
purchased, and construction and consulting services had to be
contracted. The Commission itself was a large source of
employment: at the "zenith" of the Commission's activities, a
total of 1500 workers were employed in various projects
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(divided about equally between technical, non-technical, and
administrative personnel) (Poleman, 1964:110). National costs
of the project were the large construction expenditures, which
involved a significant import content. As quoted by Barkin and
King (1970:226), the Papaloapan Commission estimated that the
import content of their total investment from 1947 to 1956 was
31.7%.
Benefits to the immediate region, besides those derived
directly from flood control', were very few. Most of the
electricity generated was consumed outside the basin, and many
potential economic benefits did not remain locally because of
the lack of an industrial base capable of supplying
manufactured and processed goods or specialized services.
Within the basin area, the benefits and costs derived from
the project were not evenly distributed. In fact, most of the
Commission projects and activities took place in the lower part
of the Basin, largely in the non-Indian zones.
In the coastal zone, a quarter-million hectares of land,
were freed of the danger of flooding, roads were built and as a
consequence new tracts for agriculture were opened, while the
benefits to highland communities were limited to the late
construction of a few schools and medical dispensaries as well
as some sanitary measures.
The National Indigenista Institute created, in 1953, the
Temascal Coordinating Center on the site area of Aleman Dam, to
offer some basic health and education services. But according
to McMahon (1973:60), by 1960 the Center was staffed with a
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physician who was available to the Clinic only once a week.
McMahon also indicates that only in 1964 did the Papaloapan
Commission implement a potable water system in Ixcatlan (a
village partially flooded by Aleman Dam), consisting of a
simple water pump and a water deposit. Further, "it was only
in 1967 that the local school building was constructed."
Directly affected by the works of Aleman Dam were four Mazatec
municipios of the lower basin, the upper basin municipios of
Tenango and Tuxtepec, and the municipio Chinanteco of Ojitlan.
As a result of the project, the relocated communities
underwent a series of changes in their social and economic
organization, but no effective improvement of their lives
occurred. Their economy was abruptly transferred from a
subsistence situation into a new system of cash transactions.
The Indian peasants, traditionally self-employed under a system
of communally-owned land, were forced to become private owners
of land holdings, and when their new lands were taken by
cash-lenders -- to whom the peasants soon became indebted in
order to acquire the production elements not supplied by the
government -- they became wage laborers in the lowlands,
migrated to cities, or went to live in the mountains.
At present, the upper-basin population still perceives the
rest of the nation through their interaction with city-based
merchants and cash-lenders in addition to a more elaborate
system of government institutions. Thus no real improvement
has occurred in their lives. The "azadon," "machete," and
"hacha" are still their most commonly used production tools.
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Roads and essential means of transportation are still lacking
(Flores de la Vega, 1974; McMahon, 1973).
In sum, it can be concluded that the Papaloapan Project
made some contribution to the economic progress of the country
as a whole, and to the economy of the lower basin. The project
did not, however, fulfill the objectives of integral
development of the Basin area.
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V. THE PAPALOAPAN PROJECT RECONSIDERED
1. The Papaloapan Project: A Preliminary Assessment
Given the many institutional, socioeconomic, and technical
elements involved, a performance evaluation of the Papaloapan
Commission through 1970 will be addressed--according to a
number of evaluation criteria--in terms of the Commission's
ability to
(i) develop the river basin's natural resources;
(ii) make use of its budgetary resources;
(iii) reduce regional socioeconomic inequalities;
(iv) promote the socioeconomic integration of the basin area;
and
(v) achieve its originally-stated objectives.
A definition of the evaluation criteria follows, along
with some notes for an assessment.
Management of Natural Resources Criterion
This criterion is aimed at inquiring about the way
resource-use decisions were made and their resulting
consequences. Specific questions that could be asked include:
was a multipurpose river-development plan in fact implemented
(hydroelectric power generation, navigation, flood control,
recreation, etc.)? Were the scale and type of water-use
projects the most appropriate for the region's requirements?
Were the resource-development sites properly chosen? How were
potential conflicts solved in resource use?
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From the previously presented description of the
Commission plans and projects, it is apparent that no
full-range of possible uses of water management was either
explored or undertaken. River development activities were
limited to flood control and hydroelectric power generation,
both effected by the construction of a single large dam. The
Papaloapan basin required a more diversified utilization of the
resource potential of its land and water. However, even basic
territorial studies were lacking at the time important project
decisions were made.
Winnie, Jr. (1958:240) on this issue indicates that even
one decade after initiating the project, the almost complete
lack of knowledge regarding the topography, hydrography,
climate, soils, and human resources of the area was a major
handicap in planning and carrying out the work of the
Papaloapan Commission. In fact, less than 3% of the
Commission's total budget was spent in area studies and general
planning during the 1947-52 period. About the same percentage
was spent.on these same categories in the second phase
(1953-58). As a direct result of the above, along with the
lack of supply of agricultural credit, the colonization
projects could not succeed. Agriculture, one of the most
important potential resources of the river basin, received only
about 4% of the total expenditures throughout the 1947-70
period.
Finally, mention should be made of the ever-present
reservoir management conflict between power generation, which
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requires minimum storage of surplus water, and flood control,
which requires maximum storage; and this is even more acute
since the power plant started to operate at full capacity "when
at peak flow as much as 3500 cubic meters per second may have
to be allowed through" (Poleman, 1964:116).
Allocation of Public Investment Criterion
This evaluation criterion addresses the issues of
consistency and continuity in the Commission's allocation of
its budgetary resources, to achieve the primary-stated
objectives.
Questions to be answered at this point include: Did the
Commission outline a coherent (short- and long-term) plan for
program and project development?
This study outlined the different stages of the Papaloapan
project, from which it can be inferred that there was lack of a
sufficiently long time-perspective for project implementation,
as well as the existence of political factors that overrode
essential economic considerations in project design. The large
Aleman Dam was built as a status symbol besides its possible
contribution to flood control. Poleman (1964:105) regards many
of the projects as "ill-conceived and grandiose," and he
specifically gives the example of the magnificent
Tinajas-Ciudad Aleman highway built in the midst of an area
that does not even have all-weather roads.
Finally, the excessive emphasis given to economic projects
(EOC) as opposed to social development ones (SOC) should be
noted (Table 5 and Table 6).
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Promotion of Regional Development Criterion
This criterion addresses the issues of a policy aimed at
reducing regional socioeconomic disparities.
Specific reference questions for assessment are the
following: Did the Commission's programs promote
self-sustained development of the basin states? Were the
Commission's activities congruent with a policy of full
development of the material and human resources of the basin
area? Did the Commission's infrastructure expenditures follow
a program for industrial development of the basin area? Did
coordination exist between national development policy and
regional actions?
From previous discussions we know that a large proportion
of the Papaloapan Basin still constitutes one of the most
depressed areas of Mexico and that in general decentralization
of industry in Mexico has not taken place. According to the
results of the regional development index presented in Figure
2, serious differences persist among the three basin states.
Veracruz ranked 19 among the 32 states of the country in 1940,
and 15 in 1970, while Puebla went from rank 28 to 23 in the
same period. Oaxaca has remained in the lowest rank
throughout. Development has taken place largely in the central
region. The tendency toward regional disequilibrium of the
states, relative to the Federal District, was highlighted in
Figure 3 (page 16 ) . From Figure 3 it appears clear that the
extent of inequalities between the Federal District and the
Papaloapan Basin states has increased. The indices of
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disparity are positive for all three: 0.87 for Oaxaca, 0.62 for
Puebla, and 0.46 for Veracruz.
Although the persistence of concentration of Mexico's
industry in a few centers is due primarily to the lack of a
national policy for decentralized industrial development, the
way the Papaloapan Project evolved and its orientation can be
considered factors that prevented the earlier and wider
development of industrial activities in the river basin, i.e.,
most of the project inputs came from outside the region. The
internal market of the region has always been limited, and the
results of the Commission's road-building program have never
been a sufficient incentive for investment location in the
area. As an example, while Oaxaca enacted a law of protection
and promotion of new industries in 1953, only two tax
exemptions were granted (a cement plant and a paper factory) up
to the first half of 1962. Puebla and Veracruz also enacted
industrial promotion laws, with 13 and 18 tax exemptions
granted, respectively, up to 1962. Up to that same year, the
Federal. District granted tax exemptions to 383 enterprises
(Lamadrid, 1974:604-605). Oaxaca's rank as the twentieth
industrial state has been maintained due to only one or two
important industrial establishments, such as the paper mill in
Tuxtepec, while most of the industrial development of Veracruz
and Puebla had taken place outside the basin area and is thus
probably not the result of the Papaloapan Commission's
activities. Puebla's central location and communication
facilities with both the Federal District and the Gulf of
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Mexico have shifted its rank from 22nd to 10th place in its
participation in industrial production during the 1940-1960
period. Veracruz has maintained itself among the top
industrial states of the country, mainly because of its
locational advantage on the Gulf of Mexico (Table 7).
The Commission, during its active stages, created some
jobs but did not set the basis for productive employment in
other fields; nor did it make any significant effort to
improve the educational levels of the basin population.
The basin economy was still largely dependent on
manufactured goods from the rest of the country and abroad in
1970. In that year, purchases from the rest of the country
(3215 million pesos) included a range of products from
chemicals, insurance, beverages, finance, clothing, steel,
machinery, transport equipment, etc., while over 40% of the
region's imports from abroad (590 million) consisted of
machinery and electrical equipment. On the other hand, over
70% of sales to the rest of the country and abroad (5741
million pesos) consisted of agriculture products, food and
beverages, and tobacco (Banco de Mexico, 1973).
Socioeconomic Integration of the Basin Area Criterion
This evaluation criterion analyzes the Commission's
ability to alter the internal socioeconomic structure of the
basin area. Among the questions that should be addressed at
this point are: Did the geographical distribution of
expenditures correspond to the needs of the various basin
zones? Did the various socioeconomic groups within the basin
share equally the Papaloapan project's benefits and costs?
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Table 7
Participation of Papaloapan River Basin States
in Industrial Production
1940 1950 1960
Percent Rank Percent Rank Percent Rank
HigheDist. 31.52 1 28.55 1 39.65 1
Loe.st.
Lowest 0.01 32 0.13 32 0.02 32Quint. Roo
Oaxaca 0.47 23 0.76 20 0.47 20
Puebla 0.56 22 3.5 9 2.32 10
Veracruz 8.22 3 12.67 2 6.80 4
Source: Lamadrid, 1971:561
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Marked social and economic differences exist between the
basin portions of the three participating states. The Veracruz
portion was better off than the rest of the basin in 1970
(development indicators, Table 8). The Veracruz portion was
relatively more urbanized while the Puebla and Oaxaca portions
remained largely rural. Veracruz's portion accounted for
nineteen localities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, while the
portions of Puebla and Oaxaca had only two and three
communities, respectively, of the same category (Nafinsa SRH,
1973).
Most of the Papaloapan Commission's works were carried out
in the Veracruz portion of the basin, i.e., throughout the
entire 1947-70 period the Commission built irrigation
facilities for 1150 hectares in Oaxaca, 3085 in Puebla, and
16,426 in Veracruz (Nafinsa-SRH, 1983). Roads were
intentionally built in Veracruz, while most of Oaxaca remained
isolated. Tables 9 and 10 show the differences in quality and
density of the road network of the three basin states. Table 9
presents the densities of both surfaced and dirt roads, while
Table 10 presents a comparison of the ratios of surfaced-road
density versus dirt-road density. These comparisons are made
for 1940, 1953, 1960, and 1969. The higher standing of
Veracruz's road network is evident.
The Commission's abandonment of its agricultural
experimentation projects, along with other structural
conditions of the basin area, prevented any significant and
generalized improvement of agricultural practices and
-74-
Table 8
Papaloapan River Basin: Some Development Indicators, 1970
Value Added No. Doctors Percentage of Percentage of
Ve cadde No. Doctors Inh Rural Population Population with
per capita per 10,000 Inhab. (2500 threshold) Potable Water
Papaloapan Basin 4534 pesos 1.9 62% 68%
Population:
2,154,486
Oaxaca Portion 2601 pesos 3.2 82% 63%
Population:
708,728
Puebla Portion 3971 pesos 6.0 56% 81%
Population:
339,297
Veracruz Portion 6001 pesos 51% 68%
Population:
1,106,461
Source: Banco de Mexico 1973 and NAFINSA-SRH, 1973
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Table 9
Papaloapan Basin States: Road Density*
1940 1953 1960 1969
Surfaced Dirt Surfaced Dirt Surfaced Dirt Surfaced Dirt
Oaxaca 0.2 11,5 9.6 0.9 15.6 2.6 31.9 11.4
Puebla 18.2 12.5 29.7 2.1 37.1 5.0 62.7 5.9
Veracruz 5.9 3.5 19.2 1.6 29.4 3.6 64.6 4.6
*km/thousand sq. km.
Data obtained from (Scott, 1982:64-65).
Table 10
Papaloapan Basin States: Road Density Ratios**
1940 1953 1960 1969
Oaxaca 0.02 10.11 5.82 2.80
Puebla 1.46 14.01 7.35 10.53
Veracruz 1.70 12.39 8.15 14.02
**Surfaced road density/dirt road density.
Data obtained from (Scott, 1982:64-65).
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technology. A comparison of agricultural productivity per
worker in 1970 shows the following results: Oaxaca 1000 pesos,
Puebla 1200 pesos, and Veracruz 2300 pesos, while the country's
highest was 16,000 for Sonora, and the lowest 900 pesos for
Tlaxcala. Agricultural productivity per hectare for the basin
states in that same year was 71 pesos for Oaxaca, 235 for
Puebla, and 362 pesos for Veracruz, while the country's highest
was 712 for Baja California and 35 pesos for Quintana Roo
(Scott, 1982:221).
The fact that most of the investment was concentrated in a
few physical projects (e.g., the Aleman Dam and roads),
prevented the appearance of an internal network of economic
transactions that could have occurred through geographical
dispersion of projects and diversification of natural-resources
development.
The pattern of economic production and exchange among the
portions of Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Puebla in the Papaloapan
basin, in 1970, shows some clear imbalances that have to be
highlighted. In 1970, both the portion of Oaxaca and Puebla
bought more from the rest of the basin than they sold; the
ratios of sales to and purchases from the rest of the basin
were 0.54 and 0.94 respectively. The opposite happened to the
portion of Veracruz in the river basin: its sales to purchases
ratio was 1.58 (Banco de Mexico, 1973).
Also in 1970, the basin portions of Veracruz and Puebla
sold more to the rest of the nation than they bought, with
sales/purchases ratios of 1.58 and 1.55, respectively. For the
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basin portion of Oaxaca, the opposite was true. Its
sales/purchases ratio with the rest of the nation was 0.92. In
contrast, the portion of Oaxaca had the highest sales/purchases
ratio abroad (3.52), against 2.36 for the basin portion of
Veracruz and 0.06 for that of Puebla. Other aspects of the
Papaloapan Basin economy are presented in Figure 4, including
value added, intermediate demand, etc., for the portions of
each state in the basin (17).
The sectoral composition of the total external sales and
purchases of the portions of each state in the Papaloapan Basin
should also be mentioned (18). Of Veracruz's main sectoral
sales in 1970, 72% consisted of food, agriculture, and animal
production, and 7% of textiles; sectoral sales for Oaxaca's
main activities consisted of food, agriculture, and animal
products (65%) and of paper and paper products (13%). Puebla's
main sales consisted of animal and food products (86%),
transportation and storage (4%), and hotels and restaurants
(2%) (crf., Figure 5).
On the other hand, main external purchases included, for
Veracruz, food (14%), chemicals (11%), oil and derivatives
(11%), and machinery and electrical equipment (9%); for Oaxaca:
food (19%), agricultural products (11%), and shoes and clothing
(10%); and finally, for Puebla, food, agricultural products
(24%), and oil and derivatives (6%) (crf., Figure 6).
Finally, as the projects undertaken by the Commission
show, no true commitment ever existed for the integration of
the basin's indigenous communities to the nation's economy and
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Figure 0
Basic Aspects of the P1apalioapan Baisin Lcoinmv 1970 (in pesos per capita)
Purchases of
Each Portion
From Rest of Basin
Ver. 120
Oax. 218
Pue. 297
From the non-Basin
part of Oax-Ver-
Pue
Ver. 461
Oax. 175
Pue. 383
From Other States
of the Country
Ver. 1777
Oax. 924
Pue. 1751
From Abroad
Ver. 299
Oax. 106
Pue. 542
Internal Inputs
Ver. 5718
Oax. 2300
Pue. 4737
Sales of Each Portion
To the Rest of Bas.
Ver. 190
Oax. 117
Pue. 279
To Non-Basin Part
of Oax-Ver-Pue
Ver. 726
Oax. 193
Pue. 711
To the Other States
of the Country
Ver. 2862
Oax. 846
Pue. 2721
Abroad
Ver. 702
Oax. 372
Pue 31
Exteril Puircses (roSs Value Added
Ver. 2656 -r. 6001
Oax. 1421 Oax. 2600
Pie. 2974 Pie. 3791
t'ota I
Transak1 i o4s
Ver. 14,375
Oax. 6,1213
Pue. 11,502
Externial Sal s Sties to Basin
Ver. 4177
<(- 0ax. 15294 Oax. 2494
l'ue. 1724 Pue. 3023
Capital Deprec'n
Ver. 534
Oax. 212
Pue. 275
1Wages & Salaries
Ver. 2274
Oax. 951
Pue. 1280
Net Capital income
Ver. 2644
Oax. 1245
Pue. 1975
Gov't Revenue
Ver. 549
Oax. 192
Pue. 252
Intermed. Demand
Ver. 5718
oax. 2300
Pue. 4737
Household Consum'n
Ver. 3069
0ax. 1978
Pue. 2151
Private Invest.
Ver. 828
Oax. 313
Pue. 658
Gov't Expenditures
and Investment
Ver. 279
Oax. 203
Pue. 214
ivinIg:, Irans Iers
. mission,
V'er. 18!
Oax. 106
Pue. 768
1970 Basin Population:
Veracruz Portion: 1,106,461
Oaxaca Portion 708,i29
Puebla Portion 339,297
Source: Papaloapan Basin Input-
OU[tlt Matrix, 1970. Banco de
Nexico, Dept. de InvestIgaciones
Industriales.
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Figure 5
Papaloapan Basin:
Sectoral Composition of External Sales, 1970-71
(percentages)
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Figure 6
Papaloapan Basin:
Sectoral Composition of External Purchases, 1970-71
(percentages)
Veracruz Portion
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tPercentage
culture. The Indians in the region constitute today the lower
socioeconomic group in the region (Coplamar, 1982), and
illiteracy (in both in Spanish and their own language) still
rules their lives. In 1970, the percentage of literate
population of ten years of age or older in the upper basin was
28%, while in the lower basin it was 72%. (The percentage of
non-Spanish speaking population was 18.4 in the upper basin and
0.6 in the lower basin [Nafinsa-SRH, 1973].)
Fulfillment of the Original Objectives Criterion
The purpose of this criterion for analysis is basically to
reconsider the correspondence between the Commission's stated
objectives and the type of activities actually performed. Some
questions for inquiry in this regard follow: Did a defined
target program, with time and geographic objectives, actually
exist? Was the decree for the creation of the Papaloapan
Commission consistent with the target program?
The decree for the creation of the Papaloapan Commission
defined the extension of activities over which the Commission
was to have control more clearly than the objectives and goals.
The Commission was supposed to pursue any activity related to
the achievement of the"integral development" of the basin area,
but as we have seen and as Shafer (1966:98) emphatically
concludes: "the project was begun primarily to control floods,
and it did little else in fact."
The Commission's activities were not the result of a
preconceived development plan; that means also that the
Commission did not specify a time period over which its
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objectives should be achieved. Moreover, the program underwent
major alterations to conform with changing national policies.
Therefore, outside of the fact that not all the objectives were
attempted, and that many of the projects initiated were not
accomplished, it is practically impossible to judge the overall
efficiency of the Commission against a target program.
* * * * *
The Papaloapan Project, in sum, made a significant impact
on the basin's area and population, but it did not alter
significantly the existing internal socioeconomic structure of
the region, nor did it contribute to overcoming the regional
differences -from a national perspective.
2. Public Investment and Regional Development in Mexico as
Seen Through the Papaloapan Project's Results
As we have seen, the economic growth of Mexico and its
consolidation as a Nation have been associated with the
appearance of serious social and regional inequalities. For
Oaxaca, one of the Papaloapan Basin states, the Papaloapan
Commission's activities did not contribute to national
territorial integration and economic progress. Oaxaca's Gross
Regional Product per capital in 1970 was still the lowest in
the country, and in 1984, poverty, illiteracy, and lack of
medical services still rule the lives of approximately 80% of
Oaxaca's predominantly rural population. However, Oaxaca, like
the rest of the river-basin area, is endowed with a significant
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resource potential: it has arable and forested lands, mineral
resources, and a 500-km coastline (UNDP-FAO, 1972).
It is from this apparent contradiction between the high
potential for socioeconomic development of a region and its
actual low level achieved that new questions regarding regional
economic development in Mexico should be addressed. The
Papaloapan Project's results make it clear that regional
economic growth and socioeconomic integration in a developing
country such as Mexico do not constitute a simple enterprise.
The Papaloapan Project became possible through a series of
factors that coincided at a given point in time. The project
was conceived and carried out under the Aleman administration,
who favored and supported industrialization. The Papaloapan
Basin as a whole, however, has yet to become an industrial
region.
Many factors can be highlighted as contributing to the
outcome of the Papaloapan Project. Among them, political
decisions at the "core" and professional preference for certain
types of projects, coupled with mismanagement of both economic
resources and the natural resources potential of the river
basin. In addition, the Commission's dependency on an external
institutional structure was translated into budgetary
instability, contributing to the lack of long-term planning.
Institutional resistance toward the Commission's actions was
also a factor determining the Papaloapan project results: the
Commission's activities were resented as an intrusion of the
federal government in the affairs of the states. Also,
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deficient knowledge of the basin environment, lack of certain
technical capabilities to operate on it, all contributed to the
Project's limited success.
The lack of a serious commitment--at the time of the
Commission's active phases--to integrate socially and
economically the entire basin and populations, was certainly an
additional factor contributing to the current developmental
problems of Oaxaca and of all the river basin's indigenous
communities.
On the contrary, the Commission's actions reinforced the
then existing socioeconomic structure in favor of the
agriculturalists of the lowlands. This is, moreover, not an
isolated case. Utria (1972:80-81) asserts that in backward and
monoculture regions, the dominant groups--usually
landowners--are the only groups having effective links with
national and political power and are the groups in position to
monopolize whatever development aid flows from national
centers.
Contrary to the staple theory's predictions, the
Papaloapan basin has remained essentially agricultural and with
limited growth. Backward, forward, and consumption linkages
failed to materialize. Essential consumer goods like processed
foods, clothing, etc., are still purchased outside the basin.
Due to the lack of complementary economic activities in the
area, most of the multiplier effects of the Papaloapan projects
have been captured outside. The internal unequal distribution
of income may have been also an important contributing factor
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preventing the development of the basin economy by limiting the
size of the region's market (i.e., the Oaxaca income
distribution produced the highest Gini coefficient of the
nation in 1969) (19).
As suggested before in this study, the contribution of
public intervention in overcoming regional socioeconomic
inequalities seems to depend on the type of investment pursued
as related to the conditions of a given region. It was
discussed before that some Social Overhead Capital investment
(SOC) is required as a prerequisite of Direct Product
Activities (DPA). Physical infrastructure investment (EOC) is
also a necessary, although not a sufficient, condition for DPA
investments to take place.
Most of the Papaloapan Commission's undertakings were
aimed at supporting sugar production expansion in the lower
basin, through EOC-type projects, while neglecting the
development of other productive activities. The lack of an
internal road network has reinforced the "enclave"
characteristics of the region. In addition, the Papaloapan
Commission did not directly participate in the establishment of
productive enterprises, an alternative policy suggested by
Hirschman (1958:89) to be followed in situations where SOC is
not plentiful.
Ingersol (1968:162) affirms that development of a people
in a river basin is essentially a process of growth in their
capacity to produce and use wealth. That may imply that the
public-sector component in development promotion should be
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concentrated on fostering conditions for self-sustained
development. Accordingly, for the Papaloapan River Basin to
become an integrated region, diversified productive activities
need to be promoted, not to achieve sectoral balance in
production per se but to respond and take advantage of the
variety of its natural resources.
* * * * *
According to the core-periphery paradigm of regional
development, specific projects (such as the Papaloapan)
fulfill--in a country's earlier developmental stages--many of
the growth requirements of the core at the sacrifice of the
periphery's interests and needs. The unequal core-periphery
relationship fosters in this way the polarization of the
pattern of urbanization and spatial growth.
Polarization, defined in the core-periphery formulation as
the flow of resources to the core, is a persistent phenomenon
for the Mexican case. The "backwash" effects of national
economic growth supporting the concentration of growth in
Mexico's central region have been stronger than any
decentralization efforts pursued. As exemplified by the
Papaloapan Basin case, the rate and pattern of development of
Mexico's states or regions has been determined and controlled
by decisions at the core through a complex interrelationship of
social, political, and economic factors.
For what has been discussed in this study, the role of
public investment in development promotion is crucial, as is
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the need for a complementary and coherent industrial
decentralization policy in order to reduce regional income
disparities. In this study, the importance of increased local
participation in a region's development was also suggested.
From our brief exploration of Hansen's theory on
infrastructure investment and development, conflict need not
exist for the achievement of both economic and regional growth.
However, there still remains the need to find a formula that
would balance the core's interests and needs with those of its
periphery.
Many other critical questions regarding practical
implementation of regional development policy also remain
unanswered, since the forces and timing of the "polarization
reversal" process are not well understood (Stohr and Todling,
1977; Richardson, 1976).
For Mexico's development--and particularly its lagging
regions--the proper allocation of scarce government revenues
is, at the present time, a critical one. Fulfilling the
country's development needs demands not only the formulation of
explicit economic and spatial policies, and the coordination in
the use of policy tools at both the national and the regional
levels. It demands also a commitment to rectify the existing
social, economic, and regional differences and marginality.
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APPENDIX
An Empirical Test of Hansen's Thesis
On the Role of Public Investment in Regional Development
The methodology used to examine the quantitative impact of
infrastructure investment on patterns of Mexican regional
income consisted of two steps. First, the states of Mexico
were statistically grouped into an intermediate and a lagging
group based on an "index" of socioeconomic development.
Second, linear equations were estimated using regression
analysis to test whether the stocks of different kinds of
infrastructure were statistically significant in explaining
differences in income within each group. The analysis was
carried out for both years 1960 and 1970 in order to see if the
classification of states and the hypothesis were valid in both
cases.
The index of socioeconomic development included the
following regional attributes: (1) percentage of dwellings with
more than one room; (2) percentage of non-agricultural working
population; (3) percentage of dwellings with piped water; (4)
percentage of literate population; and (5) percentage of urban
population. Leaving the Federal District out (the "congested
region") , the average of the index was calculated, and those
states who ranked above average were classified as
"intermediate," while those who ranked below average were
classified as "lagging" states. The results of the grouping
are presented in Table 11.
Regression Analysis Results
The impact of infrastructure on regional income was tested
by means of multiple-regression analysis. Following Looney and
Frederiksen (1981) , a production function was estimated for the
intermediate and lagging groups in the following form:
GRP = a + b.POP. + b AGGAP
l1 4 1
+ b FIRMS. + b INFRA3 1 4 1
+ E. ; b 2,b3,b4 : 0,
where i represents the individual state, GRP the Gross Regional
Product, POP the economically active population, AGCAP the
capital in agriculture, FIRMS the number of large firms
(employing six or more workers), INFRA the measure of
infrastructure, and E the error term having the traditional
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Regional grouping Based
Table 11
on Socioecononic Indicators, 1960 and 1970
1960
Rank Index
Congested Region
1. Federal District
Intermediate Regions
1. Baja California Norte
2. Nuevo Leon
3. Coahuila
4. Aguascalientes
5. Sonora
6. Chihuahua
7. Tamaulipas
8. Jalisco
9. Colima
10. Baja California Sur
11. Campeche
12. Morelos
Lagging Regions
1. Durango
2. Yucatan
3. Guanajuato
4. Sinaloa
5. Nayarit
6. Veracruz
7. Michoacan
8. Tabasco
9. Tlaxcala
10. Mexico
11. Zacatecas
12. Puebla
13. San Luis Potosi
14. Quintana Roo
15. Queretaro
16. Hidalgo
17. Chiapas
18. Oaxaca
19. Guerrero
81.8
66.0
63.4
61.2
61.0
56.4
55.6
54.6
53.2
50.4
50.2
48.0
45.8
43.8
43.7
41.8
41.4
40.0
39.0
37.8
37.6
37.4
36.8
35.8
35.6
35.4
33.1
32.4
30.0
26.8
24.3
23.7
1970
Rank Index
Congested Region
1. Federal District 88.0
Intermediate Regions
1.
2.
3.
.4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
Baja California Norte
Nuevo Leon
Coahuila
Aguascalientes
Chihuahua
Sonora
Tamaulipas
Jalisco
Baja California Sur
Colima
Mexico
Morelos
Durango
Guanajuato
Lagging Regions
Sinaloa
Campeche
Yucatan
Veracruz
San Luis Potosi
Nayarit
Tlaxcala
Zacatecas
Queretaro
Michoacan
Puebla
Quintana Roo
Tabasco
Hidalgo
Guerro
Chiapas
Oaxaca
75.8
73.6
70.0
68.0
67.0
66.4
66.0
65.8
61.0
59.4
56.4
53.4
- 53.2
52.8
51.2
51.2
48.6
48.4
47.0
46.6
46.0
45.9
45.8
45.2
44.4
43.0
42.6
40.2
35.6
34.0
32.6
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statistical assumptions. The equations were estimated for 1960
and 1970. FIRMS is included as a proxy measure of capital
stock, given that no such measure is reported.
Based on Hansen's work, it is hypothesized that EOC
infrastructure will have a statistically significant and
positive effect and SOC will havelittle or no impact on GRP in
those states that comprise the intermediate region. On the
other hand, it is hypothesized that SOC infrastructure will
have a statistically significant and positive effect and EOC
will have little or no impact on GRP in those states that are
classified as lagging.
The various Economic Overhead Capital (EOC) measures
examined are the number of plants for electricity generation
(ELEC), the railroad density (RAIL), the length of telephone
lines (TELE) , and the surface road density (ROAD). The various
Social Overhead Capital (SOC) measures examined are the number
of post offices (POST), the number of kindergartens (KIND), the
number of medical units and hospitals (HOSP), and the number
of primary schools (PRIM).
The infrastructure variable was entered into the
regression as the last variable. This was done to determine,
at the margin, whether infrastructure contributed significantly
to the improvement of the F value, given that POP, AGCAP and
FIRMS had already been taken into account. The results of the
regression analyses for the intermediate and lagging regions
corresponding to 1960 appear as Tables 12 and 13, respectively.
The corresponding analyses for 1970 appear as Tables 14 and 15.
These results are not sufficiently conclusive to prove or
disprove Hansen's hypothesis. However, the impact of EOC in
intermediate regions, and SOC in lagging regions, is apparent
in many of the equations formulated.
The results of Table 12, corresponding to the intermediate
regions, in 1960, support the Hansen hypothesis; none of the
SOC measures are significant, and two of the EOC measures are
highly significant: ELEINT60 and TELINT60 are both significant
at 99% of confidence. For the INTERMEDIATE-1960 case, the
variable FIRMS is significant, at the 95th percentile or above,
for all SOC and EOC measures.
The results of the LAGGING-1960 case (Table 13) only
partially support Hansen's thesis. Among the EOC measures,
TELAGG60 and ROADLA60 are both significant at the 90% level,
when according to the thesis under discussion, none is
expected. Among the SOC measures, KINLAG60 and RAILAG60 are
significant, as expected, at the 90% and 99% levels of
confidence, respectively. From Table 13, is also apparent that
the variable capital invested in agriculture (AGCAP) explains
the variation of regional income: it is significant (at the
95% level or above) in six of eight of the measures examined.
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TABLE 12
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT ON GRP
INTERMEDIATE GROUP 1960
a POP AGCAP FIRMS INFRA R2
Economic Overhead Capital
A.Electricity Generation
Plants (ELEINT60)
B.Railroad Density
(RAILIN60)
C.Length of Telephone
Lines (TELINT60)
D.Road Density
(ROADIN60)
Social Overhead Capital
E.Postal Offices
(POSTIN60)
F.Kindergartens
(KININT60)
G.Hospitals
(HOSINT60)
H.Primary Schools
(PRIINT60)
130.67 -1
(-1
126.17 0
(0
-40.15 -l
(-1
475.70 1
(0
17.67 5
(1
-377.37 -0
(-0
8.82 0
(0
-14.79 -0
(-0
*Significant
* *Significant
at
at
the 95% level of
the 99% level of
confidence.
confidence.
60
35)
81
48)
82
87)
34
79)
-0.078
(-0.88)
0.11
(0.89)
0.002
(0.036)
0.043
(0.31)
4
(6
4
(3
5
(9
4
(3
14
(3
-3
(-0
0
(4
-6
(-0
39
5
43
18
97
10)*
80
47
76)*
30
29)*
30 A.
56 )**
93 B.
33)
35 C.
75 )**
45 D.
97)
18 E.
96)
52 F.
45)
36 G.
10)
74 H.
48)
75
05)
21
13)
67
39)
61
19)
0.958
0.884
0.972
0 .897
0.896
0 .910
0.883
0.886
0
(1
0
(1
0
(1
0
(0
.16
.45)
.13
.27)
.12
.02)
.09
.67)
(
3
(3
4
(4
4
(2
4
(3
10
-0
11
(1
2
(0
0
(0
I
I'D
TABLE 13
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT ON GRP
LAGGING GROUP 1960
a POP AGCAP FIRMS INFRA R 2
Economic Overhead Capital
A. Electricity Generation
Plants (ELELAG60)
B. Railroad Density
(RAILAG60)
C. Length of Telephone
Lines (TELAGG60)
D. Road Density
(ROADLA60)
Social Overhead Capital
E. Postal Offices
(POSTLA60)
F. Kindergartens
(KINLAG60)
G. Hospitals
(HOSLAG60)
H. Primary Schools
(PRILAG60)
-782.38 0
(0
-1436.6 1
(0
-701.33 -0
(-0
-1619.4 0
(0
-815.37 3
(1
-1114.22 0
(0
-870.24 1
(1
-487.54 -2
(-3
*Significant at
**Significant at
***Significant at
the 90%
the 95%
the 99%
level of confidence.
level of confidence.
level of confidence.
85
56)
08
85)
30
19)
78
60)
0
(1
0
(3
0
(2
0
(3
IJ
4.89 A.
(0.95)
24.07 B.
(1.75)
0.73 C.
(1 .94)*
12.55 D.
(1. 84)*
.27
.42)
.52
.29)***
.34
.51)
.56
. 37)**
39
68)**
39
89)**
37
28)**
053
67)
2
(1
1
(1
-0
(-0
1
(1
2
(1
1
(1
2
(1
2
(4
42
92)*
39
12)
17
10)
55
30)
11
72)
99
75)
14
67)
72
9)***
0.752
0.783
0.792
0.788
0.757
0.793
0.738
0.951
20
57)
63
48)
44
02)
958
57) ***
0
(2
0
(2
0
(2
0
(0
-3
(-1
10
(1
3
(0
1
(7
92 E.
08)
56 F.
96 )*
67 G.
28)
75 H.
8) ***
The results of Table 14 corresponding to the intermediate
regions in 1970 do not support the Hansen hypothesis at all.
In this case, none of the EOC measures is statistically
significant, while among the SOC measures, KININT70, HOSINT70,
and PRIINT70 are significant at the 90%, 99%, and 95% levels of
confidence, respectively. The variable FIRINT70 is significant
in all cases, at the 95% level or above. The variable
corresponding to the economically active population (POPINT70)
is significant, at the 90% level or above, in all cases except
KININT70 and ELEINT70.
Finally, the results of Table 15 corresponding to the
lagging regions in 1970 are satisfactory in supporting Hansen's
hypothesis. In this case, none of the EOC measures is
significant, and three of the four SOC measures are
significant, as expected: POSLAG70, KINLAG70, and PRILAG70 are
significant at the 95%, 90%, and 90% level of confidence,
respectively.
From the results of Table 15, it is apparent that the
significance. in lagging regions of the capital invested in
agriculture in explaining variations in regional income (in
four of the eight measures examined) , as well as the
significance of the number of firms (FIRMS) in all of the
measures.
Summary and Conclusions
According to the results, Hansen's hypothesis is not
emphatically proven or disproven, given the limitations of the
data available at this time, the results are satisfactory and
encouraging for further testing. It should be mentioned that
Looney and Frederiksen's results for the case of Mexico (1981)
tend to confirm the Hansen thesis: economic overhead capital
has had its greatest impact on GDP in "intermediate" regions
while social overhead capital has had its greatest impact in
"lagging" regions.
The difference in Looney and Frederiksen's results and
those of this study for 1970 is explained by our imprecision in
the grouping procedure: only five regional attributes were
included in the formulation of the socioeconomic development
index. Consequently, five of the states appear in different
groups (both in 1960 and 1970) as compared to Looney and
Frederiksen's grouping.
These preliminary results lend some credence to the thesis
that regional differences in income can be lessened (or that
regional growth can be enhanced) if policy makers consider the
specific type of public investment applicable to each region.
However, more research needs to be devoted to the topic
especially in the way in which the infrastructure variables are
specified.
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TABLE 14
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT ON GRP
INTERMEDIATE GROUP 1970
a POP AGCAP FIRMS INFRA R2
Economic Overhead Capital
. Electricity Generation -89.46 5.00 -0.23 4.25 21.56 A. 0.847
Plants (ELINT70) (1.63) (-1.25) (2.69)** (1.06)
. Railroad Density -61.87 7.22 -0.15 4.52 -1.47 B. 0.828
(RAILIN70) (2.64)** (-0.80) (2.40)** (-0.04)
. Length of Telephone 56.423 5.64 -0.20 3.63 0.28 C. 0.839
Lines (TELINT70) (1.83)* (-1.07) (1.82) (0.78)
. Road Density -706.278 6.12 -0.10 5.23 5.64 D. 0.833
(ROADIN70) (1.92)* (-0.54) (2.50)** (0.51)
S-cial Overhead Capital
. Postal Offices 66.66 9.85 -0.007 4.40 -12.59 E. 0.860
(POSTIN70) (3.38)***(-0.037) (2.96)** (-1.42)
. Kindergartens 
-984.56 3.92 -0.13 5.11 20.20 F. 0.877
(KININT70) (1.46) (-0.88) (3.61)*** (1.90)*
Hospitals 518.03 10.20 0.06 7.54 -109.86 G. 0.972
(HOSINT70) (9.47)*** (0.84) (9.54)*** (-6.84)***
Primary Schools -202.25 14.01 -0.009 5.33 -3.145H. 0.912
(PRIINT70) (4.79)***(-0.07) (4.42)*** (-2.92)**
igni fic ant
ignific ant
ignificant
at the 90% level of confidence.
at the 95% level of confidence.
at the 99% level of confidence.
Il
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*S
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TABLE 15
REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT ON GRP
LAGGING GROUP 1970
a POP AGCAP FIRMS INFRA R
Economic Overhead Capital
. Electricity Generation -550.08 -1.05 0.069 6.31 10.83 A. 0.957
Plants (ELELAG70) (-0.92) (0.84) (4.82)*** (1.55)
. Railroad Density -632.38 -1.24 0.15 7.55 5.46 B. 0.95
(RAILAG70) (-1.01) (2.03)* (7.10)*** (0.74)
. Length of Telephone -545.82 -1.77 0.13 6.75 0.20 C. 0.95
Lines (TELAGG70) (-1.16) (1.70) (3.98)*** (0.67)
. Road Density -817.47 -1.35 0.15 7.72 3.93 D. 0.955
(ROADLA70) (-1.15) (2.18)** (7.62)*** (1.30)
Social Overhead Capital
Postal Offices 
-341.30 7.52 -0.04 6.01 -9.80 E. 0.964
(POSTLA70) (1.93)* (-0.38) (5.27)*** (-2.31)**
Kindergartens 
-572.25 -1.97 0.14 7.26 6.09 F. 0.961
(KINLAG70) (-1.71) (2.15)* (7.61)*** (2.01)*
Hospitals 
-591.86 -1.50 0.13 6.30 15.75 G. 0.956
(HOSLAG70) (-1.27) (1.93)* (4.60)*** (1.43)
Primary Schools -479.23 -3.47 0.07 6.98 0.83 H. 0.959
(PRILAGO70) (-2.06)* (0.93) (6.84)*** (1.83)*
* Significant at
** Significant at
*** Significant at
the 90% level
the 95% level
the 99% level
of confidence
of confidence
of confidence
I
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. A substantial part of this decree is reproduced in:
(Bancomer, 1968a).
2. As will be described later in more detail, the Papaloapan
River basin comprises two different zones: the lower
Papaloapan (or coastal plain) and the upper Papaloapan,
also referred to as the mountains or hinterland.
Throughout this study comparisons are made between the
relative development of the thirty-two states in Mexico;
between the portions of the three states that compose the
Papaloapan River basin (Veracruz, Oaxaca and Puebla); and
between the two main geographic and climatic areas that
compose the river basin, namely the upper and the lower
basin. These comparisons are based on diverse social and
economic indicators, according to available data.
3. In this study, region refers to each of the thirty-two
politico-administrative entities of the country:
thirty-one states and the Federal District, unless
otherwise specified, i.e., central region composed of a
number of states.
4. The variables of the index are: (a) state product per
capita; (b) industrial output as a percentage of state
product; (c) industrial employment as a percentage of total
employment; (d) capital investment in agriculture; (e)
irrigated area as a percentage of cultivated area; (f)
electricity consumption per capita; (g) gasoline
consumption per capita; (g) infant mortality per 1,000 live
births; (i) sugar consumption per capita; (j) percentage -of
houses with water; (k) percentage of population with shoes;
and (1) literacy.
5. Robert J. Shafer's Mexico. Mutual Adjustment Planning
(1966) and Raymond Vernon's The Dilemma of Mexico's
Development (1963) give a relation of planning agencies and
commissions in Mexico.
6. Gustavo Romero Kolbeck, "La Inversion del Sector Publico,"
Mexico: Cincuenta Anos de Revolucion. I. La Economia
(Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1960:498).
Translation of this Spanish language passage by Barkin
(1967:3).
7. According to this classification:
Northwest Region: Baja California Norte, Baja California
Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa.
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North Central Region: Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas, San
Luis Potosi, Aguascalientes.
Northeast Region: Coahuila, N. Leon, Tamaulipas.
Southwest Region: Nayarit, Jalisco, Colima, Michoacan,
Guerrero
Central Region: Guanajuato, Queretaro, Hidalgo, Mexico,
Federal District, Morelos, Puebla, Tlax.
Southeast Region: Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz, Tabasco,
Campeche, Yucatan, Q. Roo.
8. SOC is usually defined as comprising those basic services
without which primary, secondary, and tertiary productive
activities cannot function. In its wider sense, it
includes all public services from law and order through
education and public health to transportation,
communications, power and water supply, as well as such
agricultural overhead capital as irrigation and drainage
systems (Hirschman, 1958:83).
9. Hirschman's definition of SOC comprises both of Hansen's
categories: SOC and EOC. Specifically in Hansen's case,
EOC is primarily oriented toward the support of directly
productive activities or toward the movement of economic
goods. EOC consists of, for example, roads and other
transportation systems, electricity and water supply,
bridges, harbors, drainage and sewer systems, and
irrigation systems. On the other hand SOC is designed to
enhance human capital and consists of such things as
education, public health facilities, fire and police
protection, and homes for the aged (Looney and Frederiksen,
1981:287).
10. Hansen classifies regions into three broad categories:
congested, intermediate, and lagging. Congested regions
are "characterized by very high concentrations of
population, industrial and commercial activities, and
public overhead capital "(Hansen, 1965:5). While standards
of living are relatively high in congested regions, any
marginal social benefits which might accrue from further
investment would be less than marginal social costs of
pollution and congestion. Intermediate regions are
characterized by an environment conductive to further
economic activity--an abundance of well-trained labor,
cheap power, and raw materials. It is presumed that
economic activity located in the area would lead to
marginal social benefits greater than marginal social
costs. The economic situation of lagging regions offers
little to attract new firms. Standards of living are low
and current economic activity is in either small-scale
agriculture or stagnant or declining industries (Looney and
Frederiksen, 1981:287-288).
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11. This happened because foreign and Mexican private companies
were not investing in capacity expansion due to their fear
of expropriation. In order to increase electricity
generation capacity, the government created in 1937 the
Federal Power Commission (CFE).
12. Federal government concern with the flood problems of the
basin dates from the flooding of 1941. As a result, in
1943 an Interministerial Commission--involving the
Ministries of Communications, Agriculture, and the
Navy--was created. This Commission generated a study
report with recommendations, but because of the amount of
the expenditures involved, no further action was ever
taken.
13. Greenberg (1970:23) also indicates that leading figures in
the Mexican government had been very impressed with the
success of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United
States and thought that this technique might be applicable
to the Mexican environment. The head of the TVA, David
Lilenthal, was invited to come to Mexico to examine this
possibility, and during 1943-1944 he and then-Executive
Director of the National Irrigation Commission Oribe Alba
toured the country with this purpose in mind, and agreed on
its feasibility. Oribe Alba was appointed Minister of
Hydraulic Resources for the Aleman period.
14. In the 1920's and 1930's, American companies were
contracted to do most of the irrigation works, as Greenberg
(1973) describes: In order to recruit American engineers,
the Mexican government contracted with the J.G. White
Engineering Corporation on a private basis. Mr. F.
Weymouth, its head, had been for many years Chief Engineer
of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, and from this agency he
recruited C.H. Howell, Henry Thorne, Walter Packard, Max
King, and Andrew Weiss, among them the four highest ranking
men in the Bureau. Weiss later became a Mexican citizen
and was the Chief Consulting Engineer for both the CNI and
the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. Other sources of
trained personnel in the early days were the Bureau of
Waters of the Agriculture Ministry and the National
Agriculture School. In addition, the engineering faculties
of the universities were raided, resulting in the hiring of
young civil engineers who had little or no knowledge of
hydraulic engineering. Some of these men were sent to the
United States Bureau of Reclamation to observe and study,
as the American government showed little concern over
losing four of its top engineers.
15. According to Ballesteros, et al. (1970:35), when in 1947
the colonists were forced by the Commission to pay 25% of
their land and infrastructure credits in the next harvest,
and the remaining 75% in the following three years,
approximately 40% of the colonists had, as a result, to
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leave their lands. The Commission then sold part of the
land to rich cattle-raisers of Veracruz.
16. The construction of a single large dam was never considered
the best solution to the flooding problems. A study
carried out under the auspices of the National Irrigation
Commission (the predecessor of the Ministry of Water
Resources) suggested in 1946 that flood control by means of
five dams on the tributaries of the Papaloapan, levees
along its banks, and a bypass canal, was feasible but
expensive. Although the study lacked considerably more
information about the basin's hydrology--as the authors
themselves concluded--so as to proceed with the definite
construction stage it suggested a more comprehensive use of
the basin water potential.
17. Notice that the figures of Figure 4, page , are in pesos
per capita, not total amounts for the basin portions.
18. Total external sales or purchases are those transactions
between any one of the three river basin portions with all:
the rest of the basin, the non-basin portions of Oaxaca,
Veracruz, and Puebla, the rest of the nation and abroad
(crf. Banco de Mexico, 1973).
19. Selected Gini coefficients in 1969 were: Federal District,
0.50; Veracruz, 0.58; Puebla, 0.63; Oaxaca, 0.67 (highest
of the country); and Nayarit, 0.46 (lowest of the country)
(Scott, 1982:222).
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